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INTERPRETING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT:
A CASE STUDY IN PRAGMATIC JUDICIAL RECONSTRUCTION
MICHAEL SELMI*
I. INTRODUCTION.
When the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”) was enacted
in 1990, it was hailed as an emancipation proclamation for the disabled.1
Passed with overwhelming majorities in both houses of Congress, 2 the
employment provisions of the Act were intended to open up job
opportunities for the disabled so as to integrate them into the workplace.
To increase access to the workplace, the statute not only prohibits
discrimination but it requires employers to provide reasonable
accommodations to the disabled, and to the extent the employment
provisions of the statute generated any significant controversy during the
congressional deliberations it was over the potential costs associated with
the accommodation provision.3
Fifteen years after its enactment, the experience under the statute
has been quite different from what its advocates had expected, and likely
from what its critics feared. Recent studies suggest that the employment
levels of the disabled may have decreased since the passage of the Act.4
*

Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. An earlier version
of this paper was presented at a symposium on the foundations of the Americans With
Disabilities Act held at New York University Law School, and at a faculty workshop at
Boston University Law School. At both, I greatly benefited by comments I received from
the participants. I have also received helpful comments from Naomi Cahn, Kris Collins,
Charlie Craver, John Duffy, Rafael Gely, David Lyons, Larry Mitchell and Michael Stein,
as well as helpful research assistance from Kate Haskell and Pereepa Joann Moolsingtong.
1
See Edmund Newton, Disabled: The Battle Goes On, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1990, at
E1 (describing the statute as “an ‘emancipation proclamation’ for 43 million disabled
Americans”). The language is attributed to Senators Harkin and Kennedy. See 136
Cong. Rec. S9689, daily ed., July 13, 1990.
2
The bill that became the ADA was passed by a vote of 377-28 in the House and 916 in the Senate.
3
As one example, coverage in the Wall Street Journal concentrated exclusively on
the potential costs of the legislation, as well as its “astonishingly brief journey through
the Washington process.” Albert R. Karr, Rights Bill for Disabled Seems Headed for
Unusually Smooth, Quick Passage, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 1989, at A1; see also Jeanne
Saddler, Small Firms Lobby to Revise Bill Helping the Disabled: Business Fear the Cost
of Changes They Might Be Required to Make, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 1990, at B2
(emphasizing potential costs to small businesses); Albert R. Karr, Disabled-Rights Bill
Inspires Hope, Fear, WALL ST. J., May 23, 1990, at B1 (“Some employers are worried
about whom they may have to hire, but much of the opposition boils down to money.”).
4
See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu & Joshua D. Angrist, Consequences of Employment
Protection? The Case of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 109 J. OF POL. ECON. 915
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Several studies have also documented extremely low success rates among
disability discrimination complaints filed in federal court.5 Part of the low
success rate is attributable to a series of Supreme Court decisions that have
sharply limited the scope of the statute. 6 Yet, contrary to original
expectations, the accommodation provision of the statute has generated
relatively little litigation or controversy.7 Instead, much of the litigation
(2001); Thomas DeLeire, The Wage and Emplyment Effects of the Americans With
Disabilities Act, 35 J. OF HUMAN RESOURCES 693 (2000). Although the employment data
are only tangentially related to this article, they have generated a considerable amount of
controversy, so let me note that in addition to the flaws highlighted by others, these
studies seem limited due to their lack of an explanatory theory. To suggest that the law
has hurt those it was intended to help implies that there was a group of individuals, who
required expensive accommodations, who previously obtained jobs that are no longer
available to them. But if some employers have stopped hiring individuals for fear of the
cost of accommodations, it leaves open the question how those individuals were
obtaining jobs previously.
Perhaps employers are more willing to provide
accommodations voluntarily without the threat of legal sanctions, but just as plausibly,
something is amiss with the story that is being told in the decline of employment, and that
may be a poor analysis of the data. For two critiques of the economic studies see Peter
Blanck et al., Calibrating the Impact of the ADA’s Employment Provisions, 14 STAN. L.
& POL’Y REV. 267 (2003) and Samuel R. Bagenstos, Has the Americans with
Disabilities Act Reduced Employment for People With Disabilities? 25 BERK. J. OF EMP.
& LABOR LAW 528 (2004) (review essay). For a thorough discussion of the data sets and
their limitations see Richard K. Burkhauser et al., Self-Reported Work Limitation Data:
What They Can and Cannot Tell Us, 39 DEMOGRAPHY 541 (2002).
5
Ruth Colker authored two articles, based on published court decisions,
demonstrating the limited success of plaintiffs in disabilities cases, which she later
incorporated into a book. See Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act – A
Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. CIV. RIGHTS-CIV.LIB. L. REV. 99 (1999); RUTH
COLKER, THE DISABILITY PENDULUM: THE FIRST DECADE OF THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT 69-95 (2005). Colker’s findings were largely replicated by two studies
sponsored by the American Bar Association. See Study Finds Employer Wins Most ADA
Title I Judicial and Administrative Complaints, 22 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L.
REP. 403 (1998); John W. Parry, Employment Decisions Under ADA Title I B Survey
Update, 23 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 290 (1999). While the limits of
relying on published opinions for empirical work are well known, no one has disputed the
low success rate of disabilities claims, although it certainly may not be as low as the
studies indicate.
6
The cases are discussed in section III, infra, and the cases most frequently cited as
part of a judicial backlash are Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999);
Albertson’s v. Kirkinburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527
U.S. 516 (1999); Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002); Chevron v.
Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002). In addition, U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391
(2002), is also frequently criticized by commentators, but that case involves the issue of
accommodation – specifically when an employer must override a seniority system to
accommodate a disabled worker – and will not be discussed in this article.
7
Courts have split over the proper legal standard to define an unreasonable
accommodation with the dispute centering primarily on who has the burden of
establishing what is reasonable. Cf. Vande Zande v. State of Wisconsin, 44 F.3d 538 (7th
Cir. 1995) (adopting a cost-benefit approach) and Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist.,
63 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1995) (rejecting cost-benefit analysis and emphasizing employer’s
burden). Although the Vande Zande case has received considerable attention, in part
because it was written by Judge Posner, the more plaintiff-friendly Borkowski standard
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has focused on the preliminary statutory definition of who is disabled, a
question courts have generally answered in a restrictive fashion.
Explaining this unusual turn of events is a complicated task.
Within the academic literature, a consensus has emerged that the ADA has
been the subject of a judicial backlash against the disabled, either because
the Supreme Court is unsympathetic to their plight or as a means of
restricting the statute’s potential costs. Professor Matthew Diller explains:
“The term ‘backlash’ suggests a hostility to the ADA and toward those
who seek to enforce it. The backlash thesis suggests that judges are not
simply confused by the ADA; rather, they are resistant to it. It suggests
that the courts are systematically nullifying rights that Congress conferred
on people with disabilities.”8 A cottage industry of scholarship has arisen
around the judicial backlash theme to emphase the Court’s narrow
statutory interpretations and how the decisions deviate from Congressional
intent.9
In this article, I will offer an alternative story. While it is true that
the Supreme Court has read the ADA narrowly, and in a manner that is
generally inconsistent with congressional intent, I will contend that it is
wrong to attribute that narrow interpretation to a judicial backlash. My
thesis is that the Supreme Court has generally interpreted the statute
consistent with congressional expectations even as it has deviated from
those expectations as expressed in the statutory language, and more
specifically in the legislative history. As discussed in more detail shortly,
the overwhelming Congressional support for the statute obscured a broad
Congressional indifference to the specifics of the legislation – Congress
had a general intent to provide protection to the disabled without imposing
excessive costs on employers. Beyond those general principles, Congress
has drawn more adherents among circuit courts. See Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc., 244
F.3d 254 (1st Cir. 2001) (discussing cases).
8
Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 22 (2000) (footnote omitted). Diller’s article was part
of a symposium on the backlash thesis, and those articles were later collected in
BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA: REINTERPRETING DISABILITY RIGHTS (L. Krieger ed.
2003).
9
In addition to the sources cited above see, e.g., Robert L. Burgdorf, “Substantially
Limited” Protection from Disability Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model &
Misconstructions of the Definition of Disability, 42 VILL. L. REV. 409, 539-44 (1997);
Chai Feldblum, Definition of Disabled Under Federal Antidiscrimination Law: What
Happened? Why? And What We Can Do About It? 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91
(2000); Rebecca Hammer White, Deference and Disabling Discrimination, 99 MICH. L.
REV. 532 (2002); Aviam Soifer, The Disability Term: Dignity, Default, and Negative
Capability, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1279, 1304-06 (2000); Michael Ashley Stein, Same
Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 153 U.
PENN. L. REV. 579 (2004). Other examples of articles critiquing the Supreme Court
decisions will be cited throughout this article.
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had few if any specific intentions, and the Supreme Court has effectively
filled in the statute based on its own preferences, both ideologically and
institutionally, as guided by reigning social norms. The statute the Court
has constructed is not a bad statute, but it is certainly not the statute
Congress passed. At the same time, it appears that the current Congress
may prefer the Court’s reconstruction to the statute it originally enacted
given that it has not sought to overturn any of the Court’s decisions.10
The attraction of the backlash thesis is understandable because it is
a relatively simple story that feeds into the pervasive notion among
academics that the Court has interpreted the statute consistent with its own
conservative political preferences. But that story is too simple, as
reflected in the important fact that most of the restrictive interpretations
have been the product of a unanimous Supreme Court.11 Indeed, a closer
look at some basic facts reveals the inadequacy of a simple story and why
the ADA poses a unique challenge for explanatory theories. When it
comes to the ADA, we have a statute that was passed with virtually
unanimous support in both houses of Congress, with the strong support of
a Republican President as well as broad public support,12 which has been
rewritten in a restrictive fashion by a near unanimous Supreme Court
without any subsequent efforts to overturn those decisions. That sequence
of events is not easy to explain, and as will become clear, the Court’s
decisions cannot be rationalized against any principled means of statutory
interpretation.13
.
As discussed in more detail below, the passage of the ADA, like its
predecessor the Rehabilitation Act (“Rehab Act”), occurred through rather
curious means. The statute was shepherded through Congress without
significant controversy by a group of Congressional legislators all of
whom had personal experience with disabilities, either in their own lives
10

One indication of this preference is that there has been no movement within
Congress to amend the ADA, even though many of what are generally considered the
Court’s most pernicious decisions, such as Sutton v. United Airlines could readily be
nullified by simple legislative action. The Sutton case, which involved the important
question of whether in defining disability an individual should be evaluated taking into
account any available mitigation measures, is discussed further in section III, infra.
11
The Court’s most criticized decision, Sutton v. United Airlines, was a 7-2 decision,
with Justice Stevens and Breyer in dissent. All of the other cases that are typically
associated with the backlash thesis were unanimous decisions.
12
Public opinion polls have long shown extremely high support for the ADA and the
rights of the disabled more generally. For example, in 1991, 95% of those surveyed
supported a prohibition on discrimination based on disability, and 83% supported
requiring employers to provide accommodations. See Survey conducted by Louis Harris
Associates, May 15-June 18, 1991, for the National Organization on Disability (available
at www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/cgi). The support has been consistent over time. See
Elaine B. Sharp, The Dynamics of Issue Expansion: Cases From Disability Rights and
Fetal Research Controversy, 56 J. OF POLITICS 919, 933 (1994) (discussing early polls
and strong support for affirmative action measures).
13
See section IV, infra.
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or with relatives, and the statute was enacted without the presence or aid
of a substantial social movement. 14 As a result, Congress passed an
extremely broad statute, modeled after the Rehab Act, and then turned
over its particulars to agencies and interest groups. And here is where the
problems began. Rather than push for narrow legislation that would have
protected the individuals Congress principally had in mind, the interest
groups, along with interested Congressional staff, opted for broad
statutory language that could have incorporated a much larger group of
individuals into the statute’s scope – most of whom no one would have
considered disabled prior to the passage of the Act. It could be argued that
this is what legislation is intended to do, create protections for those who
were otherwise invisible, but the individuals I am referring to – those who
wear glasses, sustain workplace injuries, or are allergic to perfume – were
never intended to be the subject of the legislation and there seems little
public support for extending statutory protections to those individuals.
Significantly, most of the restrictive statutory interpretations have arisen in
cases involving non-traditional disabilities.15
A predictable result of the Supreme Court’s narrow statutory
construction designed to eliminate those unintended, and often frivolous
claims, is that the Court also carved out a whole class of individuals who
were intended to be covered by the statute, namely those whose
disabilities can be controlled with medication, including those with
epilepsy and depression, among others. 16 While these decisions are
problematic and contrary to the intent of the statute, I do not agree that
they are the result of a backlash against those with disabilities. In fact, the
Supreme Court, and lower courts have both been reasonably protective of
14

This issue is discussed in detail in section IV, infra.
See Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (myopia); Toyota Motor Mfg. v.
Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) (work-related carpal tunnel syndrome); Murphy v. United
Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516 (1999) (hypertension); U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S.
391 (2002) (bad back); Chevron v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002) (hepatitis C). Another
case decided at the same time as Sutton involved an individual who only had vision in
one eye, which would likely be considered a traditional disability although he was able to
self-correct to improve his vision. See Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555
(1999).
16
See, e.g., Nese v. Julian Nordic Const. Co., 405 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2005) (plaintiff’s
epilepsy was controlled by medication and therefore he was not disabled); Ristrom v.
Asbestos Workers Local 34, 370 F.3d 764 (8th Cir. 2004) (individual’s treatable
depression did not qualify as disability); Doyal v. Oklahoma Heart, Inc., 213 F.3d 492
(10th Cir. 2000) (same); Orr v. Wal-Mart Stores, 297 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 2002) (diabetic
not disabled). Many courts, however, have analyzed the particular circumstances to
determine whether, even with mitigating measures, the plaintiff is disabled and have
frequently found that the plaintiff was still limited in a major life activity, under the terms
of the statute. See Lovejoy-Wilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel, Inc., 263 F.3d 208 (2d Cir.
2001) (epilepsy constitutes a disability); Lawson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 245 F.3d 916 (7th
Cir. 2001) (diabetic substantially limited and therefore disabled); Head v. Glacier
Northwest, Inc., 413 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2005) (individual’s depression interfered with
sleep thus qualifying him as disabled).
15
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individuals with traditional disabilities 17 – it is only the attempted
expansion of the definition of disability that has been rejected. But as just
noted, that rejection was entirely predictable. Without broad public
support, without a strong social movement pushing to expand our notion
of disabilities, it was simply too much to expect the Supreme Court to
interpret the ADA expansively, or even to construe the statute consistent
with congressional intent so long as the statute provided interpretive room
for judicial discretion, which it did.
In this article, I will first explore the history of disability rights
legislation to describe Congress’ general indifference to the substance of
the ADA, and to explain that many of the controversies that have arisen
over the ADA were also present with the Rehab Act. I will then analyze
several of the Supreme Court decisions that have restricted the scope of
the statute to again show that the Court’s actions were predictable and
consistent with existing social norms relating to our perceptions of the
disabled. In the final section, I will draw several lessons from the ADA
case study, including how the decisions cannot be justified based on any
principled theory of interpretation but might be better understood against
the backdrop of positive political theory in which the Supreme Court is
seen as a strategic actor seeking to impose its own preferences, only in this
instance the Court appeared primarily concerned with institutional rather
than political preferences. Finally, I will suggest that the absence of an
effective social movement has severely limited the success of the statute,
and has solidified the Court’s interpretations since Congress has faced no
significant pressure to overturn the decisions.
II. TOWARDS THE PASSAGE OF THE ADA.
Although the ADA is the latest statutory manifestation of
governmental prohibitions on discrimination against those with disabilities,
disability issues have long been on the governmental agenda. Social
security provides payments to those who are disabled and unable to work,
and beginning in the 1950s there have been concerted efforts to integrate
the disabled both into the workplace and society more generally.18 Those
efforts have varied over time, as have social attitudes towards the disabled,
but it is important to stress that issues relating to the disabled have a long
17

See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) (finding asymptomatic HIV-positive
individual covered by ADA). Another case, this one more surprising, in which the Court
offered broad protection was Cleveland v. Policy Mgt. Systems Corp., 526 U.S. 795
(1999), where the Court held that an individual could pursue an ADA discrimination
claim even while receiving disability social security benefits because the two statutes had
different definitions of disability.
18
For discussions of how the ADA fits within other disability schemes see Samuel R.
Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1 (2004) and Richard V.
Burkhauser & Mary C. Daly, U.S. Disability Policy in a Changing Environment, 16 J. OF
ECON. PERSPECTIVES 213 (2002).
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and complex history even while the comprehensive antidiscrimination
protections are relatively new. In addition, disability issues are implicated
in a variety of statutory schemes, including workers’ compensation, the
Family and Medical Leave Act, as well as social security. schemes. In
other words, the ADA forms one part of a complex regulatory scheme.
Before exploring the evolution of the ADA, it is important to
highlight two fundamental issues that define and differentiate
antidiscrimination protection for the disabled compared to other
antidiscrimination mandates. First, unlike race, gender or age where the
protected class is reasonably well defined, the ADA begins with a
threshold question of who qualifies as disabled. As discussed in detail in
the next section, defining disability has proved to be the most difficult
judicial task and has, in turn, led to most of the controversial decisions.
Both the ADA, and its predecessor statute the Rehab Act, rely on an
unusual definition of disability, one that defines the disabled as an
individual who has “a substantial limitation on a major life activity.”19
The statutes also provide protection for those who are “regarded as”
disabled.20 These definitions are quintessentially legal in nature, requiring
interpretation of virtually every term without clear social norms to help
guide those determinations. In general, there is a core notion of disability
for which a broad consensus exists, a category that is often defined as
traditional disabilities, but once we move beyond that core, there appears
to be little consensus regarding who ought to be defined as disabled.
Relatedly, the very heterogeneity of disability poses difficult interpretive
and statutory problems. Disability can be permanent or temporary, it can
arise at birth or from work-related incidents or other accidents, or develop
later in life; some disabilities are visible, while many are not and different
conditions affect individuals differently so what might be disabling in one
person may not be to another. Together these factors complicate both the
very notion of disability and statutory enforcement efforts.
There is another important way in which the issue of disability
rights is distinct from most other antidiscrimination workplace mandates.
For many, having a disability means having differential abilities that may
render one less capable of performing certain jobs or functions unless the
employer provides an accommodation. This is certainly not true of all
disabilities but it is a background assumption underlying the need to
provide accommodations to the disabled.21 Although a rich literature has
19

42 U.S. C. § 12102(2).
Id.
21
It should be noted that within the disability rights movement, the need for an
accommodation is often seen as a social construct, that society has been constructed
around a limited norm of ability. See, e.g., Kay Schriner & Richard K. Scotch, A Human
Variation perspective on Overcoming Oppression, 12 J. OF DISABILITY POL’Y STUDIES
100, 100 (2001) (“One key rationale for the ADA was that many of the problems
associated with having a disability were not inevitable products of impairment, but rather
20
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developed over the accommodation mandate contained in the ADA, in
particular how that mandate is similar to other mandates contained in
antidiscrimination statutes, 22 there is little question a public perception
exists that disability accommodations are both necessary and potentially
costly. Indeed, the public debate on the ADA focused almost exclusively
on the costs of accommodation, rather than on the more important
threshold question of who will qualify as disabled.23
These two differences – the need to define the class and the
accommodation requirement – obviously run together. The broader the
class, the greater the accommodation burden will be. It is also possible
that the broader the class becomes, the less force the antidiscrimination
mandate will have, particularly if the class is stretched to include
individuals society would not otherwise identify as disabled. Relatedly, an
expansive class may diminish support for the accommodation mandate,
especially if employers are asked to provide costly accommodations for all
manner of health conditions. So although the issues of definition and
were the result of a socially constructed environment that arbitrarily and perniciously
excluded or limited social participation.”). Given that the statute includes an
accommodation requirement as well as means for employers to avoid having to
accommodate some disabilities, it is not clear that it is accurate to say that this concern
motivated the ADA. Nevertheless, there is no question that within the disability
community, this was one of the intended purposes, and one that the statute has likely not
influenced, as discussed in more detail in section IV. For an extended treatment of the
social model see Ravi A. Malhotra, The Legal Politics of Globalization and Workers
With Disabilities in Canada and the United States (dissertation on file with the author).
22
See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Rational Discrimination, Accommodation, and the
Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825 (2003); Seth D. Harris, Law,
Economics, and Accommodations In the Internal Labor Market, New York Law School
Public Law and Legal Theory paper 05/06, 13 (2006, available on ssrn.com); Mark
Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV. 833 (2001); Christine
Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223 (2000); Christine Jolls,
Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642 (2001); Samuel
Issacharoff & Justin Nelson, Discrimination With a Difference: Can Employment
Discrimination Law Accommodate the Americans With Disabilities Act? 79 N.C. L. REV.
307 (2001); Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and
Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1 (1996); Michael A. Stein, Same Struggle,
Same Difference: ADA Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579
(2004); Michael A. Stein, The Law and Economics of Disability Accommodations, 53
DUKE L.J. 79 92003); J.H. Verkerke, Disaggregating Antidiscrimination and
Accommodation, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1385 (2003).
23
This was apparent in the major newspaper coverage of the statute, almost all of
which focused on the potential cost of accommodation, often in the area of public
services. See note 3 supra. To the extent there was any discussion regarding the
potential breadth of the statute, it involved the incorporation of AIDs into the definition
of disability. For a sampling of the newspaper coverage see Susan F. Rasky, How the
Disabled Sold Congress on a New Bill of Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1989, at D5;
Marlene Cimons, Far-Reaching Bill to Protect Disabled from Discrimination Gains
Speed, L.A. TIMES, July 30, 1989, at A6; Steven A. Holmes, Rights Bill Sent to Bush,
N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1990, at A6; Sharon LaFraniere, Doors Opening for the Disabled,
WASH. POST, May 25, 1990.
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accommodation are typically treated as distinct, they are closely related
and over the last decade the Court has expressed a strong interest in the
definition of disability without devoting substantial time to the potential
costs of accommodation.24 With those background presumptions in mind,
I will now explore the origins of the federal statutes relating to disability
in the workplace.
A. The Passage of the Rehab Act.
Both the Rehab Act and the ADA were passed by Congress under
unusual circumstances. Both acts received widespread support within
Congress – the ADA passed with overwhelming majorities in both houses
– despite serious opposition from the business lobby. This was true even
though at the time the Rehab Act was passed in 1973, the disability
community formed only a loose advocacy coalition without substantial
legislative experience. By the time of the passage of the ADA, much had
changed although the disability community remained a loose
confederation of groups primarily focused on specific disabilities and
often with conflicting agendas.25 The passage of the Acts, which came in
the face of simultaneously broad congressional support and widespread
congressional indifference, helps elucidate some of the eventual problems
that have arisen during the first decade of ADA implementation.
The Rehab Act was primarily staff-driven legislation, in which a
handful of congressional staff members succeeded in ensuring the bill
passed without much legislative attention, and then later helped to shape
its direction by crafting extensive regulations. 26 As historian Ruth
24

In its decisions, the Court has addressed the issue of accommodation on two
occasions, neither of which involved cost issues. In US Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391
(2002), the Supreme Court held that, in the ordinary course, employers were not required
to override a seniority system as a means of accommodating a disabled worker. At issue
was the importance of seniority in a workplace and neutral workplace rules, but the case
did not turn on the cost of the accommodation, which would have been trivial. The other
case that implicates the accommodation mandate involved the professional golfer Casey
Martin who sought to use a golf cart on tour, a claim that was filed under the public
accommodation provisions and which again did not involve any direct costs. See PGA
Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001) (finding that Martin and golf tournament were
covered under the ADA and Martin was entitled to an accommodation).
25
One example is that wheelchair advocates seek ramps although those ramps can
make it more difficult for blind individuals to get around. Similarly, much of the deaf
community has explicitly fought against assimilation into the hearing culture.
26
The history of the Rehab Act is traced in RICHARD K. SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL
TO CIVIL RIGHTS (2d Ed. 2001). In general, I will avoid excessive citations, and note that
my description of the passage of the Act comes primarily from Scotch supra, several law
reviews cited within and RUTH O’BRIEN, CRIPPLED JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF MODERN
DISABILITY POLICY IN THE WORKPLACE (2001); JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, NO PITY: PEOPLE
WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1993); JACQUELINE
VAUGHAN SWITZER, DISABLED RIGHTS: AMERICAN DISABILITY POLICY AND THE FIGHT
FOR EQUALITY (2003).
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O’Brien noted, the Rehab Act, also known as section 504, arose “without
much forethought,” it just emerged.27 Despite its stealth nature, President
Nixon twice vetoed the Rehab Act, although it was ultimately enacted in
essentially its current form. That form offers a very short directive
applicable to the federal government and those receiving federal financial
assistance.28
When the statute was initially passed, it contained a vague
definition of handicap, the term that was in use at the time. During the
following year, a more comprehensive definition was fashioned at the
agency level, and the statute was amended in 1974 to incorporate the
definition that continues to define disability today. 29 The definition of
handicap was, and the definition of disability is:
“Any person who (A) has a physical or mental impairment
which substantially limits one or more of such person’s major life
activities, (b) has a record of such an impairment, OR (c) is regarded
as having such an impairment.”30
This definition requires virtually every term to be interpreted:
substantially limited, major life activity, and what it means to be regarded
as having an impairment. After several years of delay, administrative
regulations were developed to provide some guidance for interpreting the
provisions of the Rehab Act,31 but perhaps more important to the evolution
of disability rights was the open-ended language that went to the core of
the statute’s scope.

27

O’BRIEN, supra note 26 at 118. Sociologist John Skrentny has explained the
development of section 504 in a similar fashion: “There were no details or explanations
as to what [the statute] would mean and what limits might be on the potential remedies
for exclusion. Section 504 was simply a part of the politicians’ repertoire for addressing
a group that they saw as analogous to black Americans. No one paid any attention to
what would become a revolutionary new policy. There was never any discussion of
Section 504.” JOHN D. SKRENTNY, THE MINORITY RIGHTS REVOLUTION 270 (2002).
28
The language of section 504(a) is: “No otherwise qualified individual with a
disability in the United States, as defined in section 7(20), shall, solely by reason of her
or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the
United States Postal Service.” 29 U.S.C. §794(a) (as amended).
29
See Burgdorf,, supra note 9, at 420-21 (discussing origins of the definition of
disability within the Rehabilitation Act). The language that now defines disability was
enacted as the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974. See Pub. L. No. 93-516, 88 Stat.
1617.
30
Pub. L. No. 93-516, 88 Stat. 1617.
31
The regulations were held up by the Reagan administration and were promulgated
following several high profile protests where disabled individuals occupied offices of the
responsible agency. See SCOTCH, supra note 26, at --.
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As noted previously, the need to define the protected class renders
disability statutes different from other antidiscrimination statutes, and
there is no easy way to define disability, or at least no easy way that will
garner consensual support. 32 One possible approach would be to list
certain conditions or disabilities that qualify for coverage but this
approach would have the substantial disadvantage of requiring
amendments any time a new disabling condition arose. Given the way
Congress, or any legislature operates, it was therefore important to adopt
language that was sufficiently open-ended to allow for necessary evolution.
Another approach might be to provide a non-exclusive list of qualifying
conditions while leaving courts to determine whether conditions that are
not included on the list should be covered disabilities. This was, in fact,
the approach taken in the regulations that were promulgated under the
Rehab Act,33 although those regulations were not ultimately incorporated
in the statutory language of the ADA.
Not only is it difficult to define disability, but there is a significant
dispute over what constitutes a disability, or how disability ought to be
defined. The disability rights community generally favors a broad
definition, one that is distinctly inclusive.34 Part of the impetus for a broad
definition appears to stem from a desire to destigmatize the concept of
disability: labeling more people as disabled may destabilize the existing
norms regarding abilities and what it means to have a disability. While
this might be a sound political project, it makes for a difficult legal one. A
broad definition, for example, might dilute the meaning of disability,
particularly if virtually any individual can be defined as disabled, and it
might also open the door to frivolous claims by individuals seeking to take
advantage of an opportunity to enter the federal courthouse. This in turn
might alter the public support for disability rights, especially taking into
account the cost concerns that accompany the accommodation mandate.
Indeed, a broad definition is likely to fuel additional concerns about
imposing excessive costs on businesses. At the same time, there is little
question that the prospect of a broad and inclusive definition enlarged the
advocacy community for the statute and ultimately the push for a broad
definition prevailed.35

32

This is true even within federal statutes because of the varying contexts. For
example, the statute that governs education of the disabled focuses on functional issues
relevant to schooling. See Mark C. Weber, Reflections on the New Individuals With
Disabilities Education Improvement Act, 58 FLA. L. REV. 7 (2006).
33
The regulations are discussed extensively in Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline,
480 U.S. 273 (1987).
34
For an influential approach along these lines see MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL
THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION & THE AMERICAN LAW (1990); see also
Burgdorf, at 539-44 (critiquing judicial restrictions of disability definition).
35
See SWITZER, supra note 26, at 101 (noting that some of the statute was expanded to
increase political support).
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With this background in mind, three related aspects of the passage
of the Rehab Act are noteworthy as they relate to the eventual passage of
the ADA. First, the Rehab Act was pushed by a handful of Senators with
a deep interest in the subject who met very little opposition within
Congress. 36
This intense but small support allowed interested
congressional staff, and later agency staff, to shape the legislation without
significant vetting or compromise. Second, the bill was adopted without
much public input, and without the development of any substantial social
movement that may have helped increase both public awareness and a
societal commitment to disability rights.37 As a concept, there is very little
opposition to providing rights to the disabled;38 however, as evident by the
two Presidential vetoes of the Rehab Act, there are substantial concerns
regarding the costs that might accompany those rights and once the
legislative initiative slides closer to the “special rights” or affirmative
action category, public support weakens substantially. 39 Third, and
directly related to the cost issue, the government’s interest in providing
disability protections is multifaceted and its varied interests can lead to
conflicting statutory goals. To be sure, there is a strong desire to prevent
discrimination against the disabled, as well as a desire to aid their quest to
enter the workplace so that they can obtain the benefits that employment
provides. The government, however, also has a different and distinct
interest because moving disabled individuals into the workplace will often
move them off the public welfare roles.40 It is not always clear how this
interest plays out, but it is another factor that makes disability different
from other protected categories and may explain why these statutes faced
so little opposition within Congress.41
36

See SCOTCH, supra note 26, at 150-51.
Linda Krieger has noted, “[B]y the time the ADA was passed relatively little
popular consciousness raising around disability issues had taken place.” Linda Hamilton
Krieger, Sociolegal Backlash, in BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA (L. Krieger ed. 2003);
see also SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 117 (“The fight for disability rights was a largely
invisible, almost underground, movement.”).
38
See polls cited earlier note 12. In his work, Skrentny has concluded that, “Among
all the groups who were part of the minority rights revolution . . . Americans – or at least
their government leaders – see disabled Americans as the most deserving.” SKRENTNY,
supra note, at 274. Obviously, this is a broad statement and there are many exceptions,
including the infamous Buck v. Bell and the eugenics movement. See Buck v. Bell, 274
U.S. 200 (1927).
39
See Kelman, supra note 22. The Rehabilitation Act, in fact, contains an affirmative
action component requiring the federal government and those with federal contracts that
exceed $10,000 to establish affirmative action programs for the disabled. See 29 U.S.C.
§§ 791 & 793.
40
See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans With Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform,
44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 921 (2003) (discussing government’s interests in reducing
welfare rolls).
41
A similar interest overhangs age discrimination, and Congress has, in fact, moved
back the age of retirement as a way of limiting the costs of social security. See Sara E.
Rix, The Aging of the American Workforce, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 593, 602-03 (2006)
(discussing increase in retirement age to 67 and its implications).
37
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B. From the Rehab Act to the ADA: the Rehab Act Cases.
Although the ADA has generated a tremendous amount of
controversy and litigation, the Rehab Act was a very modest statute that
failed to generate a substantial body of case law. To offer one example,
between 1973 and 1984, a total of 360 cases mentioning the Rehabilitation
Act appeared in the LEXIS appellate court file, and most of those cases
did not involve the substantive aspects of the act but instead focused on
various jurisdictional issues. 42 There were, in fact, very few cases
interpreting the definition of handicap.43 In contrast, a similar search for
the single year 1997 turned up more than 900 appellate cases mentioning
the ADA, a substantial number of which involved the very definition of
disability.44
Even though the case law was sparse, many of the issues that have
surfaced with the ADA were also present under the Rehab Act, and
examining these cases demonstrates that courts approached the issues
quite similarly. For example, the first case the Supreme Court decided on
the merits of the Rehab Act, Southeastern Community College v. Davis,
exposed many of the contemporary tensions that remain prominent in the
disability rights debate.45 The case involved a deaf nursing student who
was seeking accommodations from the college for her studies; the
Supreme Court, however, found that she was not qualified for the position
because she would be unable to perform the functions of a nurse, and as a
result, the college was under no obligation to accommodate her
disability.46 In arriving at this conclusion, the Supreme Court rejected an
agency interpretation as inconsistent with the statutory language, and also
rejected the statements of interested members of Congress. 47 The
unanimous opinion also distinguished between affirmative action
42

The search was a very simple one “Rehabilitation w/2 Act” and date (bef 1985).
Much of the case law involved educational issues and questions as to whether a private
right of action existed under section 504 and whether the federal financial assistance had
to be in a program related to the plaintiff.
43
To be sure, there were some isolated successes particularly in district courts. See,
e.g., Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (individual with history of drug
use qualified as handicapped); Vickers v. Veteran’s Administration, 549 F. Supp. 85 (W.
D. Wash. 1982) (individual with hypersensitivity to tobacco smoke handicapped). But
for every successful case there were an equivalent number of failed claims. See, e.g.,
Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (overweight individual
not handicapped); De la Torres v. Bolger, 610 F. Supp. 593 (N.D. Tex. 1985), aff’d 781
F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1986) (left-handed individual not handicapped).
44
The search in the LEXIS appellate database was “date (is 1997) and disability! and
employ!” and produced 994 cases. This statistic is not meant as anything other than a
rough comparison, as it was done nonscientifically and the nature of the reporting
services has changed so that many more unreported decisions are now available
electronically.
45
442 U.S. 397 (1979).
46
Id. at 410-11.
47
Id. at 411 & n.11.
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obligations, which were not at issue in the case, and the statute’s equal
treatment mandate.48 All in all, as will become clear shortly, the Court’s
decision had much in common with the contemporary cases decided under
the ADA.
That was also true of the Court’s next case, Alexander v. Choate,
although this case was decidedly more mixed in the benefits it offered to
the disabled. 49 Like Davis, Choate was not an employment case, but
instead involved a challenge to a limitation on Medicaid reimbursement
for hospital stays. An important part of the case concerned whether the
Rehab Act permitted disparate impact challenges, which the Court
answered affirmatively.50 However, in another unanimous opinion, this
time written by Justice Marshall, the Court also expressed a “desire to
keep § 504 within manageable bounds,”51 noting further that the statute
did not guarantee equal results. 52 Under these principles, the Court
ultimately upheld the challenged regulation.53
If the first two cases were setbacks to a broad definition of
disability, the third case may have appeared to open the door to an
expansive judicial approach. In School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline,
the Supreme Court held that contagious diseases, in this case tuberculosis,
fell within the scope of the statute, either under the definition of disability
or under the “regarded as” language.54 The Arline case was undeniably
significant, and it almost certainly sealed the subsequent decision to
incorporate the Rehab Act’s definition into the ADA if for no other reason
than the case was decided during the Act’s development in Congress.55
At the same time, the success of Arline may have obscured some of the
fundamental differences between the two statutes that would render an
open-ended definition of disability less suited to a more comprehensive
statute like the ADA, as well as the pattern of prior restrictive decisions
that had arisen under the Act. In addition to the cases discussed, Congress
also passed three statutes in 1986 to override three Supreme Court
decisions involving the rights of the disabled. In these statutes, Congress
overturned restrictive interpretations as applied to air carriers, sovereign
48

Id. at 410.
469 U.S. 287 (1985).
50
Id. at 297.
51
Id. at 299.
52
Id. at 304.
53
Id. at 309.
54
480 U.S. 273 (1987).
55
A related case that was decided shortly after Arline, suggested the Court might be
inclined to limit the definition of disability. In Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535 (1988),
the Supreme Court upheld a Veteran’s Administration regulation denominating most
alcoholism as willful misconduct, and therefore not a disability, as consistent with the
mandate of Section 504. The issue was decided over the vigorous dissent of Justice
Blackmun, who was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall.
49
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immunity issues, and education remedial issues. 56 Contrary to the stated
views of most disability advocates, very few cases brought under the
Rehab Act sought to expand the definition of disability to include nontraditional disabilities, and those few cases typically failed.57
As a result, by the time the ADA deliberations began, the Rehab
Act offered a rather weak model for implementing broad disability
protections. If anything, the experience under the Rehab Act should have
offered caution, rather than unbridled optimism, about the future course of
disabilities law,58 particularly in the context of a disabilities statute that
left substantial room for judicial interpretation. Indeed, as Professor
Charles Craver has emphasized, the plaintiff ultimately lost her claim in
Arline because it was determined that her disease rendered her unqualified
to teach.59
C.

The Passage of the ADA.

The ADA was introduced in Congress in the late-1980s at the
behest of a number of members who had particular experience with
disabilities. The primary house sponsor Tony Coehlo suffered from
epilepsy and had been subjected to discrimination in his youth as a result
of his condition. In the Senate, Tom Harkin, whose brother was deaf, took
the lead, where he was joined by many other influential Senators who also
56

See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the
Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 613, 631-33 (1991)
(discussing the statutes).
57
As noted, very few such claims arose in the appellate courts, and I could not find
any claim involving high blood pressure, chemical sensitivity, or some of the other cases
that have arisen with frequency under the ADA. At the time of the Rehab Act, the claims
that sought to stretch the statutory definition involved mental disabilities such as
depression, which was less well accepted as a disability at the time. See, e.g., Doe v.
Region 13 Mental Health-Mental Retardation Comm’n, 704 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1983)
(employee’s depressive neurosis rendered her no longer qualified for her job); Hart v.
City of Baltimore, 625 F.2d 13 (4th Cir. 1980) (claim of disability relating to chemical
imbalance abandoned at oral argument). On the flip side, some of the conditions that are
now litigated, were accepted as disabilities without question under the Rehab Act. See
Bentivegna v. U.S. DOL, 694 F.2d 619, 621 (1982 ) (diabetic unquestionably
handicapped under the Rehab Act).
58
Chai Feldblum has argued that at the time of the ADA, the courts’ interpretations of
the Rehab Act had been generally favorable to an expansive interpretation. See Chai
Feldblum, Definition of Disabled Under Federal Antidiscrimination Law: What
Happened? Why? And What We Can Do About It? 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91
(2000). Looking at the cases she relies on suggests that many, and perhaps most, of the
claims involved traditional disabilities and were not particularly difficult cases. What
would be important to know is whether certain conditions or impairments were defined as
a disability under the Rehab Act that are not so defined under the ADA. Even then, it is
important to keep in mind that extending the Rehab Act into the private sector would
create new issues for courts compared to the relatively obscure Rehab Act.
59
See Charles B. Craver, The Judicial Disabling of the Employment Discrimination
Provisions of the Americans With Disabilties Act, 18 LABOR LWYR. 417, 423 (2003).
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had personal experience with disabilities -- Senator Kennedy had a sister
who suffered from mental retardation, Bob Dole lost the use of his right
arm in the military, and Senator OrinHatch’s brother-in-law suffered from
polio.60 These and other members would play critical roles in ensuring the
passage of the ADA, and perhaps because of the personal connections to
issues of disability, there was virtually no opposition to the ADA in either
the House or the Senate.
Among advocates, the lack of opposition is almost always seen as
desirable because it speeds the bill’s journey through the legislature. The
lack of controversy, however, can just as easily lead to problems during
the implementation of the statute that might have been addressed through
more careful congressional deliberation. This was particularly true in the
context of the ADA, which arose at an unusually complex time concerning
the interaction between Congress and the courts. At the time the ADA
was passed, Congress was largely receptive to the demands of civil rights
groups, while the Court was not, resulting in a situation in which the
courts, if given an opportunity, could readily take away what Congress
had provided. This tension between the branches should have counseled
in favor of clear statutory language designed to limit judicial discretion.
Yet, rather than crafting specific language that would tie the Court’s hands,
the disability community quickly opted to import the broad definition of
disability from the Rehab Act into the ADA. It is quite possible that this
move simply proved too irresistible given that it would be difficult for
Congress, or the statute’s opponents, to object to a definition it had already
adopted.
At the same time, there were many reasons why a broad
definition that relied on judicial interpretation would prove problematic
for the ADA.61
Perhaps most significantly, a broad definition of disability was in
clear tension with the tenor of the Supreme Court at the time. An openended and potentially expansive definition of disability would have its best
chance to succeed with a Court that was sympathetic to the statutory goals
or perhaps one that was determined to remain faithful to the congressional
language. Yet, in 1988-89 when the ADA was debated in Congress, there
was no reason to see the Supreme Court as sympathetic to any aspect of
civil rights. The Civil Rights Acts of 1990 and 1991 were designed to
overturn a series of hostile civil rights decisions, and there was no reason
to expect the Supreme Court of the early 1990s to interpret the ADA any
60

See SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 117-19. In addition to the Congressional members,
President Bush had a son with a severe learning disability, and Attorney General
Thornburg’s son suffered significant head injuries in an accident. Id. at 119.
61
Cf. Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, Disability, Equal Protection, and the
Supreme Court: Standing at the Crossroads of Progressive & Retrogressive Logic in
Constitutional Classification, 35 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 81, 85 (2001-02) (suggesting
that Congress was negligent for adopting Rehab Act definition).
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differently than it had interpreted Title VII.62 In fact, there was reason to
expect that the Court might treat the ADA even more hostilely, since the
ADA did not have the broad public support of Title VII, nor did it have a
lobbying arm as powerful as the AARP with respect to the ADEA, or the
traditional civil rights groups such as the NAACP for Title VII. The ADA
was also a new and innovative statute that posed issues to which a
conservative court would naturally be skeptical, in large part because of
the explicit cost considerations embodied in the accommodation mandate.
After all, the Supreme Court’s evisceration of the disparate impact
standard in the notorious Ward’s Cove case, which prompted the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, arose primarily due to a judicial concern with the
costs the impact standard imposed on employers.63 Looking to Title VII,
then, as opposed to the Rehab Act, there was no reason to expect the
Supreme Court would be receptive to the far-reaching and novel aspects of
the ADA, and this was true even before the onslaught of frivolous
disability claims that later emerged.
At the same time, while the Supreme Court appeared to be in a
manifestly hostile mood towards civil rights, Congress’s disposition was
almost exactly the opposite. In detailing the history of the passage of the
ADA, one of the lobbyists noted that it was a very difficult time to move
civil rights legislation through Congress, but historically this was deeply
inaccurate.64 The Congress that passed the ADA was among the most
prolific in our nation’s history in passing Civil Rights legislation, and
undoubtedly the most prolific since the mid-1960s. During the time the
ADA was under consideration, Congress passed the Civil Rights
Restoration Act of 1987 (to overturn a Supreme Court decision), the
Family Medical Leave Act, ultimately three times because of two
presidential vetoes, substantial amendments to the Fair Housing Act, an
important Age Discrimination bill, a revision of the Rehab Act, as well as
the Civil Rights Acts of 1990 and 1991.65 If ever there was a time for
passage of civil rights legislation, it was in the late 1980s.
All of this legislative activity came with a downside that was
particularly problematic for the ADA. Of all the civil rights statutes that
62

See William N. Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 333 n.4 (1991). This is a part of the ADA story that is
often overlooked by those who focus on the limitations of the ADA, without thinking
more broadly about other civil rights statutes. The ADA was considered in Congress at
the same time the highly controversial Civil Rights Acts of 1990 and 1991 were being
debated, though virtually all of the public attention, and controversy, were focused on the
Civil Rights Acts rather than the ADA.
63
490 U.S. 642 (1989).
64
SWITZER, supra note 26, at 86.
65
See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987); 42 U.S.C. § 3601
(Fair Housing Act Amendments of 1988); 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Civil Rights Act of 1991);
42 U.S.C. § 2601 (Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993); 29 U.S.C. § 626 (Older
Workers Benefit Protection Act).
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were passed towards the end of the decade, the ADA proved among the
least controversial. The Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) was
vetoed twice by President Bush; 66 the Civil Rights Act of 1990 was
likewise vetoed,67 and the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was headed for a veto
until the Clarence Thomas hearings intervened.68 As a consequence, all of
these statutes received more congressional attention, and more legislative
massaging than the ADA. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, for example,
provided very specific statutory language that has guided the Supreme
Court in a more moderate direction over the last decade.69
The lobbying community also made an important tactical decision
that may have further limited the possibility of an expansive interpretive
approach to the statute. Early in the process the lobbying community
decided not to mount a large publicity campaign for the ADA or to rally
broad public support for the statute but instead decided to work solely
within Congress.70 This decision was primarily due to a sense that public
support for the statute was unnecessary and might stir up unwanted
opposition.71 Congressional support for the statute was strong, and there
was very little open opposition within Congress to the goals of the ADA.
What little opposition there was centered on questions relating to
homosexuality, and a handful of conservative members of Congress
criticized the potential scope of the Act but to no persuasive effect.72 In
light of this broad support, the business lobby also decided early in the
66

Kara Swisher, Twice-Vetoed Family Leave Act Takes Effect: Law Allows Twelve
Weeks of Unpaid Time Off Without Loss of Benefits, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 1993, at D8.
67
See 136 Cong. Rec. § 16562 (1990) (Presidential veto message on Civil Rights Act
of 1990).
68
As a young attorney with the Lawyer’s Committee for Civil Rights, I participated
in the drafting of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The bill was effectively stalled until the
Clarence Thomas hearings brought attention to discrimination issues, in particular to the
lack of damages for sexual harassment that did not result in the loss of a job. Senator
Danforth, who was simultaneously shepherding his former aide Clarence Thomas
through his contentious hearings while serving as the Republican leader on the Civil
Rights Act, pledged to ensure passage of the Act regardless of the outcome of the
confirmation hearings. With his leadership, the act passed the day after the hearings
concluded without any significant legislative record being developed. For a similar
recollection see Roger Clegg, A Brief Legislative History of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
54 LA. L. REV. 1459, 1469-70 (1994) (labeling the Thomas hearings as a “breakthrough”
for the passage of the Civil Rights Act.).
69
See discussion infra note 155 and accompanying text.
70
See SWITZER, supra note 26, at 107 (“Avoiding the media and any attempt to try to
explain the legislation to the press became a key element of the fight for passage of the
ADA.”).
71
See Joseph Shapiro, Disability Policy and the Media: A Stealth Civil Rights
Movement Bypasses the Press and Defies Conventional Wisdom, 22 POL’Y STUDIES J.
123 (1994)(discussing strategy and disregard for the media).
72
For discussion of the limited opposition see Wendy F. Hensel & Gregory Todd
Jones, Bridging the Physical-Mental Gap: An Empirical Look at the Impact of Mental
Illness Stigma on ADA Outcomes, 73 TENN. L. REV. 47, 58-59 (2005) and Burgdorf,
supra note 9.
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process to deescalate its opposition and to instead focus on fashioning a
bill it could live with.73
The decision by the lobbying community to produce a statute
under the public radar ultimately proved a mistake, and likely a serious
one. Without broad public support, without a coherent social movement
pushing an expansive agenda, there was little reason to expect that the
ADA could, by legislative fiat, expand the definition of disability to
include those with nontraditional disabilities. Not only was there no
apparent public support for an expansive approach to disability, but the
statute’s normative force was never adequately articulated. There was, for
example, no public discussion of why the ADA did not involve “special
rights,” why the accommodation mandate was a product of right and
equity rather than special treatment akin to affirmative action, or why
disability rights ought to be seen as equivalent to earlier civil rights
movements. In a recent article, Professor Michael Stein notes that many
continue to view the ADA as involving special rights, but without a social
movement to change that perception, there was very little the legislation
could do to alter the public consciousness.74 More was needed than new
legislation, and that more never materialized. Instead, the disability rights
community feared a public dialogue and sought refuge in the courts, the
wrong place, by almost any measure, for refuge.
Had there been a public dialogue, it is also quite likely that the
disability community would have opted for a more narrow statutory
definition because the community would have been required to advocate a
basis for the statute, a basis that would have likely stemmed from
discrimination, structural barriers that could be alleviated, or the needs of
the disabled. This may have also focused the advocacy community on
justifying a broad definition of disability or to confront some of the many
issues that have subsequently arisen, such as whether temporary
disabilities, or disabilities that arise out of work, are deserving of statutory
protection, or whether individuals with rather minor conditions, such as
allergies, ought to be treated as disabled. The advocacy community, in
fact, seemed fully aware of this problem, and its efforts aimed at ensuring
passage of the Act all focused on traditional disabilities. Indeed, virtually
all of the public displays and protests relating to the ADA suggested a
relatively narrow definition of disability, one that emphasized traditional
disabilities, and one that is consistent with the later court interpretations.
Deaf students at Gallaudet University mounted highly visible and
successful protests calling for a deaf University President, disabled
73

See Paula Yost, Business Not Fighting Bill for Disabled, WASH. POST., at A12, Aug.
19, 1989 (explaining that business lobby decided to work towards a more palatable bill
rather than opposing it outright).
74
Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations
as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PENN. L. REV. 579 (2004).
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individuals crawled up the Capitol building to demonstrate its lack of
accessibility, while others tied themselves to buses and engaged in similar
protests centered around traditional disabilities. 75 The members of
Congress whose support was based on personal experiences with
disabilities also involved traditional disabilities, including deafness, cancer,
paralysis, and epilepsy. In other words, entirely missing from the public
debate was a discussion regarding the need for a broader definition of
disability, one for which public support appeared to be missing and a
public justification lacking.
In addition to the experiences under Title VII and the Rehab Act,
the nascent Fair Housing Act (FHA) amendments also should have given
pause to the hope of an expansive judicial interpretation, although in
fairness the statute was far too new to provide much guidance on the ADA.
Nevertheless, the experience under the FHA is instructive because it has
paralleled that of the ADA. Early in the life of the FHA amendments
many claims arose that sought to stretch the definition of disability to
include chemical sensitivity to fertilizer; to avoid no pet policies in
apartment complexes, some plaintiffs argued that their pets were support
animals necessary to combat symptoms of depression.76 It is unlikely that
all of these claims were frivolous, but almost all of the claims were
unsuccessful.
Before discussing the Supreme Court cases interpreting the ADA, I
want to highlight one other problem that was lurking in the background
75

See SHAPIRO, supra note --, at 127-30 (discussing Gallaudet protests). For a booklength treatment see JACK R. GANNON, THE WEEK THE WORLD HEARD GALLAUDET
(1989). More recently, student protests erupted again at Gallaudet over the selection of a
President who was not seen as sufficiently tied to the deaf community, in part because
she read lips. The protests resulted in the Trustees changing their decision. See Susan
Kinzie, Nelson Hernandez & David A. Fahrenthold, Gallaudet Board Ousts Fernandes:
As Protesters Cheer, Trustees Say Law-Breakers Will be Held Accountable, WASH. POST,
Oct. 30, 2006 at A1.
76
For some of the chemical sensitivity cases see Braldey v. Brown 42 F.3d 434 (7th
Cir. 1994) (excluding evidence relating to multiple chemical sensitivity under Daubert
test); Summers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Sys., 132 F.3d 599, 603 (10th Cir. 1997) (labeling
multiple chemical sensitivity a “controversial diagnosis”); Gabbard v. Linn-Benton
Housing Auth., 219 F. Supp. 2d 1130 (D. Ore. 2002) (excluding evidence and citing
cases where theory has been rejected), aff’d, Wroncy v. Oregon Dept. of Transportation,
94 Fed. Appx. 559 (9th Cir. 2004). Cases involving pets include Bronk v. Ineichen, 54
F.3d 425 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that dog had “no discernible skills” but was rather a
“simple house pet and weapon against cranky landlord”); Wells v. State Manuf. Homes,
2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 136048 (D. Me. 2005) (rejecting claim that pet was necessary
accommodation to get around no-pet policy); Prindable v. Ass’n Apt. Owners of 2987
Kalakana, 304 F. Supp. 2d 1245 (D. Haw. 2003) (bulldog was not a trained service
animal). When the dog is trained to provide specific services, courts often will override
no pet policies. See Green v. Housing Authority, 994 F. Supp. 1253 (D. Ore. 1998)
(trained dog permitted for hearing disabled child); Fulciniti v. Village of Shadyside
Condo Ass’n, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23450 (W.D. Pa. 1998) (permitting dog trained to
help individual with MS).
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that should have provided additional caution to those seeking an expansive
definition of disability. A broad interpretation posed particular problems
for employers, not just in the immediate costs of accommodation, but in
providing opportunities for workers to raise excuses for their workplace
behavior. There are very few things that anger employers more than lazy
workers or workers seeking to gain an unearned advantage in the
workplace, and courts interested in protecting the interests of employers,
as many are, would likely interpret the statute to ensure that it did not
become a font for worker grievances. Indeed, to the extent the ADA was
perceived as providing statutory protections to lazy workers, malingerers,
and whiners -- those who have a difficult time coping with the everyday
stresses of the workplace -- it was a virtual certainty that courts would cut
back on the statute to eliminate those protections. In fact, that is what
happened. To date, the largest volume of ADA claims have been brought
by individuals with bad backs, which is largely an extension of an issue
that has long plagued social security and workers’ compensation systems
where back injuries have generated a tremendous amount of litigation and
controversy for decades.77 As noted earlier, efforts to expand the FHA
amendments to cover various conditions not typically thought of as
disabilities, such as chemical sensitivity, have been met with strong
resistance, and similar issues have arisen in the educational context,
particularly as it relates to learning disabilities where the rise in the
number of diagnosed disabilities has produced a sharp public reaction.78
In a similar context, there have been widely publicized attacks on the work
of Sigmund Freud and the efficacy of psychotherapy more generally,79 as
77

On its website, the EEOC reports that injuries to the back accounted for 11.4% of
ADA claims filed with the agency between 1992-2005. Only two other categories
involving non-specific conditions, that denominated “Other” and “Regarded As,” had
higher percentages. The statistics can be found at www.eeoc.gov/stats/ada.html. On
back injuries in other contexts see David Mechanic & Ronald J. Angel, Some Factors
Associated with the Report and Evaluation of Back Pain, 28 J. OF HEALTH & SOCIAL
BEHAVIOR 131 (1987) (discussing prevalence of back pain in disability and workers’
compensation claims).
78
John Silber mounted a public attack on the concept of learning disabilities one that
was ultimately rejected in the district court. See Guckenberger v. Boston University, 974
F. Supp. 106 (D. Mass. 1997) (finding BU’s policy on learning disabilities in violation of
ADA). While John Silber is a controversial figure, many mainstream and thoughtful
academics have also questioned the rise of learning disabilities. See, e.g., MARK
KELMAN & GILLIAN LESTER, JUMPING THE QUEUE: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGAL
TREATMENT OF STUDENTS WITH LEARNING DISABILITIES (1997). For an overview of the
issues relating to learning disabilities and accommodation see John D. Ranseen &
Gregory S. Parks, Test Accommodations for Postsecondary Students: The Quandary
Resulting from the ADA’s Disability Definition, 11 PSYCH. PUB. POL. & LAW 83 (2005).
79
Frederick Crews mounted strong attacks on Freud in the left-leaning New York
Review of Books that received widespread attention. See FREDERICK CREWS, THE
MEMORY WARS: FREUD’S LEGACY IN DISPUTE (1995). An earlier critique by Jeffrey
Masson became something of a best seller. See JEFFREY MOUSSAIEFF MASSON, ASSAULT
ON TRUTH: FREUD’S SUPPRESSION OF THE SEDUCTION THEORY (1984), and later FINAL
ANALYSIS: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF A PSYCHOANALYST (1990).
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well as repressed memory syndrome,80 Ritalin and ADHD,81 all of which
suggest that society has not embraced the broad definition of disability
pushed by advocates, a definition that could encompass somewhere
between one-quarter and one-half of all Americans. Absent either
inexplicably clear statutory language or broad public support, it was surely
a mistake to think these non-traditional disability issues might be
favorably received in the courts. And, true to form, they have not been.
Some of the very first claims to arise under the ADA came from
law students seeking additional time on the bar examination because they
had bad memories, claims that generally failed.82 My nonscientific review
of the literature suggests that the most frequently requested workplace
accommodation is a right to work at home, or in the alternative, a right to
set one’s own hours, or to come in late.83 Not surprisingly, these claims
have uniformly failed and one reason is that they are precisely the kind of
claims that the business community becomes most exercised about
because, to them, these claims exude laziness or malingering. 84 These
claims also reflect the way in which the disability statute can be abused by
80

See ELIZABETH LOFTUS, THE MYTH OF
AND ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL ABUSE (1996).
81

REPRESSED MEMORY: FALSE MEMORIES

See, e.g., Bill Scanlon, Scamming for Ritalin: College Students Fake AttentionDeficit Disorder, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Mar. 8, 1998, at 54A (discussing students seeking
Ritalin for its buzz effect); John Merrow, Reading, Writing, and Ritalin, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
21, 1995, at 21 (“Ritalin is so plentiful that in some junior high schools it’s a ‘gateway
drug,’ the first drug a child experiments with.”); Rebecca Paul, Atlanta Leads South in
Ritalin Prescriptions: Critics Say Many Kids Don’t Need the Drug, ATL. J. & CONST.,
Nov. 8, 1992, at A1 (lead story on “Ritalin controversy”).
82
See, e.g., Argen v. New York State Bd. of Examiners, 860 F. Supp. 84 (W.D. N. Y.
1994) (plaintiff failed to establish specific learning disability); Christina v. New York
State Bd. of Examiners, 899 F. Supp. 1254 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (dismissing case after
plaintiff passed the bar examination). There were also a series of early challenges to bar
exam inquiries regarding mental health treatment, which ultimately led to modifications
of most state policies. See Clark v. Virginia Bd. of Examiners, 880 F. Supp. 430 (E.D.
Va. 1995).
83
See, e.g., Moore v. Payless Shoe Source, Inc., 139 F.3d 1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 1998)
(“An employee who is unable to come to work on a regular basis [is] unable to satisfy
any of the functions of the job in question . . . “); Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 530 (D.C.
Cir. 1994) (coming to work regularly is an essential function of the job); Halperin v.
Abacus Tech. Corp., 128 F.3d 191, 198 (4th Cir. 1997) (regular attendance at job
required); Rauen v. United States Tobacco Mfg., 319 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2003) (request to
work at home found unreasonable as accommodation); Mason v. Avaya Communications,
Inc., 357 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2004) (denying right to work at home to individual
suffering from post-traumatic stress syndrome).
84
For representative cases see Tyndall v. National Educ. Centers, 31 F.3d 209, 213 (4th
Cir. 19940 ((“a regular and reliable level of attendance is a necessary element of most
jobs . . .”); Rauen v. United States Tobacco Mfg., 319 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 2003) (“The
reason working at home is rarely a reasonable accommodation is because most jobs
require the kind of teamwork, personal interaction, and supervision that simply cannot be
had in a home office situation.”). Extrapolating to the Supreme Court, the same reception
was almost assured. After all, Justice Rehnquist died in office, Justices O’Connor and
Ginsburg worked through serious illnesses, and Justice Stevens is still working at age 86.
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individuals who have no other outlet for their workplace complaints, often
as a result of the formidable employment-at-will rule which sharply limits
the common law rights of workers. Because of this limitation, workers
often search for any statutory grounds to state a claim and the malleable
nature of the disability definition has led many employees – likely
prompted by attorneys – to try to fit their claims under the ADA. Even
though many individuals who brought such claims may have had
legitimate health conditions that should have fallen within the literal scope
of the ADA, there was little question that the claims would be received
hostilely. But this is quite different from a backlash, or if it is a backlash it
is one that is not unique to the courts as the effort to expand the definition
of disability to reach nontraditional disabilities has failed to gain broad
societal acceptance.
This confluence of factors rendered the prospects of an expansive,
or literal, interpretation of disability remote at best. Instead what should
have been expected was a substantial judicial rewriting of the statute, one
that was likely to mirror existing social norms, where there is generally
broad support for protecting those with serious disabilities – even though
there remain substantial concerns regarding the potential costs of
accommodation – and little support for extending the statute to those who
appear undeserving of protection.
III.

THE CASES: A BACKLASH?

The social backdrop presented above leads to a discussion of the
Supreme Court cases typically defined as the heart of the judicial backlash.
In this section I will explore the cases, with a particular focus on Sutton v.
United Airlines, and seek to explain the rationality of the decisions, or
alternatively, why the decisions were highly predictable given the
statutory directive and governing social norms.
A. Sutton v. United Airlines: Restricting the Scope of the Statute.
The case of Sutton v. United Airlines involved twin sisters who
worked as commuter airline pilots and sought to move up the professional
ranks to fly commercial planes for United Airlines.85 The Sutton sisters
suffered from severe myopia and were unable to satisfy the airlines’
qualification standard of having uncorrected vision of 20/100. 86 When
85

See Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
Because the Supreme Court decided that the Suttons did not qualify as disabled
under the statute, the airline never had to justify its rule. Presumably the rule was based
on safety concerns, particularly in the event of turbulence or some other disruption during
which the pilot might lose her glasses. Kenji Yoshino has suggested that, as an
accommodation, the Suttons could have been allowed to bring an extra pair of glasses on
the plane. KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 175
(2006). Having an extra pair of glasses may have helped in the event one pair broke (or
86
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United rejected them based on their eyesight, the sisters sued arguing that
their condition rendered them disabled under the statute and required the
airline to provide a reasonable accommodation, presumably allowing them
to wear corrective lenses while flying. Alternatively, they argued that if
they were not disabled under the terms of the statute, the employer was
regarding them as disabled because United was treating them as if their
eyesight was a substantial limitation.87
With those facts in mind, it is difficult to conceive of a worse test
case than the Suttons presented and the only real surprise was how close
the case ended up – and it was close only because the dissenters
understood just how much was at stake.88 Nevertheless, the Sutton case is
generally identified as the critical backbone of the judicial backlash,89 so a
detailed analysis of the case will help demonstrate why it is a misnomer to
label the interpretive developments as a backlash against the disabled.
Rather, the Sutton case is best understood as the product of a poorly
worded statute that too easily opened itself to opportunistic plaintiffs who
were never intended to be its beneficiary.90

contact lenses came out) but would not help in the more likely circumstance of turbulence
or other disruption.
87
The “regarded as” issue will be discussed further below, but I also want to
highlight a potential problem with the argument that rendered it ill-fitting for this case.
Under the original vision of the statute, a plaintiff who is regarded as disabled should not
need an accommodation because they are not disabled. The Suttons, however, would
have needed an accommodation: they could not see sufficiently without their glasses,
and so they would need to be allowed to wear them. Courts have split over the question
whether an accommodation is required for those who are regarded as disabled. See
D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, 422 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that employer must
offer accommodations to regarded as disabled individuals and discussing circuit split)
88
Justice Stevens and Breyer dissented
89
For critiques of the Sutton case see Samuel A. Marcosson, Of Square Pegs &
Round Holes: The Supreme Court’s Ongoing “Title Vii-ization” of the Americans With
Disabilities Act, 8 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 361, 374-78 (2004); Aviam Soifer, The
Disability Term: Dignity, Default, and Negative Capability, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1279,
1304-06 (2000); Rebecca Hammer White, Deference and Disabling Discrimination, 99
MICH. L. REV. 532 (2002).
90
As noted previously, for a variety of reasons, the statute has generated an unusually
large group of claims based on conditions not typically identified as a disability. For an
additional sampling of cases, all of which were unsuccessful see Nuzum v. Ozark Auto
Distribs., 432 F.3d 839 (8th Cir. 2005) (tendenitis in left elbos); Anderson v. North
Dakota State Hosp., 232 F.3d 634 (8th Cir. 2000) (fear of snakes); Sinkler v. Midwest
Prop. Mgt., 209 F.3d 678 (7th Cir. 2000) (fear of driving in unfamiliar places); Land v.
Baptist Med. Ctr., 164 F.3d 423 (8th Cir. 1999) (peanut allergies); Heilweil v. Mount
Sinai Hosp., 32 F.3d 718 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1147 (1995) (asthma
aggravated by work); Byrne v. Bd. of Educ., 979 F.2d 560 (9th Cir. 1992) (allergy to
fungus); Cormier v. Littlefield, 112 F. Supp. 2d 196 (D. Mass. 2000) (temporary knee
injury); Kristofor v. Schinbben, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2809 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (allergy to
latex); Cameron v. Navistar Intern. Transp. Corp., 39 F. Supp. 2d 1040 (N.D. Ill. 1998)
(fearing of being around suspended tools); Dewitt v. Carsen, 941 F. Supp. 1232 (N.D.
1996) (correctional officer’s stress caused by interaction with inmates), aff’d, 122 F.3d
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The primary doctrinal question presented in Sutton was whether
determining if an individual is disabled should consider available
mitigating measures or whether that preliminary inquiry should assess the
plaintiff in his or her unmitigated state. Within disability law, this is an
enormous question because many potentially disabling conditions can be
mitigated through various corrective measures such as hearing aids,
prosthetic devices and perhaps most commonly, medication. Taking into
account mitigating measures might exclude from the statute’s protective
scope individuals who formed the core group Congress intended to protect,
including individuals with epilepsy, such as the original House Sponsor
Tony Coehlo, since epilepsy can generally be controlled by medication.91
Ignoring mitigating measures, on the other hand, would allow many
individuals who would not be considered disabled in any ordinary sense of
the word into federal court, and to the Supreme Court, this group included
those who wear glasses. In the briefs, and at the oral argument, it was
repeatedly emphasized that as many as 100 million Americans used
corrective lenses 92 and the Supreme Court was exceedingly unlikely to
open the door to all, or even some, of those individuals.
As a result, this was the very kind of case that could have been
anticipated by the legislative drafters but, if left unaddressed in the statute,
would likely lead to a narrowing of the statute’s scope. This was true not
only because the potential class was enormous, but as such unsympathetic
plaintiffs the Suttons played on all of the Supreme Court’s fears regarding
the potential direction of the statute. For example, this case could be
identified as falling within the special rights category insofar as the
plaintiffs could be perceived as undeserving plaintiffs seeking an unfair
advantage in the workplace.93 The Suttons already had very good jobs,
and their glasses posed a real safety issue to passengers.94 On this score,
even if the Suttons had been defined as disabled, they ultimately would
have lost their claim as a safety matter, given that the statute permits work
rules necessary to ensure safety under several different statutory
approaches.95
1079 (11th Cir. 1997); Mescal v. Marra, 49 F. Supp. 2d 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (mental
anxiety caused by interaction with supervisor).
91
See SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 117.
92
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 487 (“[T]he number of people with vision impairments alone is
100 million.”).
93
While the Suttons were not demonstrably less qualified than other candidates given
that the vision requirement was a safety issue rather than one that went to their ability to
fly a plane, it was easy to see this case as involving individuals seeking to take advantage
of a statute that was not designed for their benefit. But see Pamela S. Karlan & George
Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, & Reas. Accom., 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 14 (1996)
(equating duty to accommodate with affirmative action).
94
See note 69 supra. The only mitigating factor was that United had the most
stringent requirement in the industry.
95
This point was emphasized by Justice Stevens in his dissenting opinion. Id. at 511
(Stevens, J. dissenting). One might have argued that the airlines should be required to
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The most important failing of their claims, however, was that their
condition had nothing to do with the underlying concept of discrimination:
there is no basis for claiming that those who wear glasses are the victims
of discrimination (schoolyard taunts aside) that federal law ought to
concern itself with. Nor was there any sense that with their glasses on, the
Suttons were limited in their ability to see. Rather, with their glasses on,
they were like anyone else who regularly wears glasses and their daily life
was not generally affected in any substantial way. It is difficult to
conceive of any reason a Court ought to want to protect these individuals,
and the reasonable fear that there were many more individuals like the
Suttons waiting in the wings made their claim even more precarious.
In their defense, the Suttons had extremely poor eye-sight and the
Court certainly could have drawn a line designed to exclude from the
statute’s scope only those with less severe limitations. But the Court
needed a reason to draw that line, and it never found one. At the oral
argument, this issue was addressed explicitly by one of the Justices. 96
Even though the Suttons may have been more limited in their ability to see
than most people, the Justice noted, once they put on their glasses they
were effectively the same. 97 Why then should the severity of the
underlying condition matter when the mitigating measures equalize them?
The answer proffered by the Suttons’ attorney was wholly unpersuasive.
He claimed that the statute told the Court to make that distinction, an
argument that was incorrect on two different levels. The statute said
nothing about whether mitigating measures should be considered in the
disability calculus; that issue was addressed specifically in the Committee
Reports, a place a majority of the Court was reluctant to look.98 More to
prove the danger but that would obviously be a significantly more expensive proposition
if all such work rules had to be justified. Moreover, this seems like precisely the kind of
claim where intuitive analyses are likely to prevail: while there may have been only a
small risk of harm, the potential danger is tremendous, the very kind of situation that is
most likely to be magnified.
96
Sutton was decided at a time when the Justices were not identified by name in the
oral argument transcripts.
97
A substantial portion of the oral argument was devoted to the question whether
such a line was possible, and desirable. The Oral Argument transcript is available at
1999 WL 281310.
98
Although by the time of Sutton, a majority of the Supreme Court had become
hostile to legislative history, the movement away from reliance on legislative history was
clearly present at the time the ADA was adopted. Both Judge Easterbrook and Justice
Scalia had long and forcefully challenged the relevance of legislative history. See, e.g.,
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988)(Scalia, J.) (writing for the Court and rejecting
committee reports); United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 345 (1988)(Scalia, J.
concurring)(“[I]t must be assumed that what members of [Congress] thought they were
voting for, and what the President thought he was approving when he signed the bill, was
what the text plainly said, rather than what a few Representatives or even a Committee
Report, said it said.”). Judge Easterbrook laid out his theory in a series of highly
influential articles. See Frank Easterbrook, The Rule of Original Intent in Statutory
Construction, 11 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 59 (1988); Frank Easterbrook, The Supreme
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the point, neither the statute nor the legislative history suggested that the
severity of the unmitigated condition should be a relevant factor – from
the legislative materials, the question was whether mitigating factors
should be considered not whether they should sometimes be considered.
A decision to focus on the severity of the underlying condition could only
arise from a pragmatic determination to limit the breadth of the disability
class while preserving what might be considered core claims. Yet, the
Suttons were not within the core group, and part of their argument, a part
that went unarticulated, was that the Court should provide them statutory
coverage as a way of preserving coverage for other deserving plaintiffs –
those who use prosthetic devices, suffer from epilepsy or other substantial
conditions that can be treated with medication. This is understandably a
difficult argument for a party to make and there were good reasons why
the argument went undeveloped.
Importantly, the Court sought to limit the potential damage of its
ruling by noting that even those who have access to mitigating measures
may still qualify as disabled so long as they remain limited in a major life
activity.99 This part of the Court’s decision has mitigated some of the
fears of the blacklash critics, and plaintiffs with serious disabilities, for
example, those who might use prosthetic devices or those with severe
depression, have generally qualified as disabled even after Sutton.100 In
this way, the Court drew a line that sought to preserve core claims while
excluding those the Court considered beyond the proper scope of the
statute. By proper, I do not mean that which was consistent with
congressional intent. As alluded to above, the legislative history was
reasonably clear that an individual should be considered in their
unmitigated state.101 By proper, I mean what the Court considered the
appropriate scope of the disability statute, independent of Congress’s
actual intent.
There remains the complicated issue of the “regarded as” prong of
the statute, which is where much of the criticism of the case has
focused.102 The Suttons argued that if they were not disabled under the
Court, 1983 Term – Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4
(1984); Frank Easterbrook, Statute’s Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983).
99
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 488 (“The use of a corrective device does not, by itself, relieve
one’s disability. Rather, one has a disability under subsection A if, notwithstanding the
use of a corrective device, that individual is substantially limited in a major life activity.”).
100
See cases cited in footnote 16, supra.
101
See, e.g., H. Rep. No. 101-485, pt.2, at 50 (1990) (“Whether a person has a
disability should be assessed without regard to the availability of mitigating measures,
such as reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids.”); S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 23
(1989) (“[W]hether a person has a disability should be assessed without regard to the
availability of mitigating measures, such as reasonable accommodations or auxiliary
aids.”).
102
See, e.g.,, Miranda Oshige McGowan, Reconsidering the Americans With
Disabilities Act, 35 GA. L. REV. 27, 122-27 (2000) (critiquing Sutton’s interpretation of
regarded as while supporting the Court’s holding on mitigating measures); Wendy
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statute, then by considering their eyesight as a substantial limiting
condition United Airlines was certainly treating them as if they were.
Why else, one might ask, was United Airlines restricting their job
opportunities? This argument proved too clever by half, as the saying
goes, though it certainly had some support in the statutory language.
However, as a practical matter, this issue was destined to fail. If the
Supreme Court had allowed a “regarded as” claim in this particular case,
all of the benefits of its initial holding on the mitigating conditions would
have been lost because once it was determined that the plaintiff was not
disabled, she would then turn to a “regarded as” claim. This is, in fact,
what happened in a large number of early disability claims where
plaintiffs frequently tagged on a regarded as claim as a safety valve.103
Yet, just as the Court’s holding on the glasses issue was inevitable, so too
was its interpretation of the regarded as prong, where the Court crafted the
virtually impossible standard that an employee is regarded as disabled
only to the extent that the employer regards her as unqualified from a
broad class of jobs.104
Although the Court’s decision has sharply limited the force of the
regarded as prong, as a matter of discrimination, the Court’s rationale was
not so extreme. One of the problems with the regarded as language is that
it has always been difficult to know what protection the provision was
intended to provide. The regarded as prong probably could only work in
the context of what courts would consider the most deserving of plaintiffs
– those who are disabled but who do not need accommodations.105 Let me
Parmet, Plain Meaning & Mitigating Measures: Judicial Interpretations of the Meaning
of Disability, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 53, 63-64, 89-90 (2000) (criticizing Court
for restricting definition of regarded as); Aviam Soifer, The Disability Term: Dignity,
Default, and Negative Capability, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1279, 1304-06 (2000) (critiquing
regarded as portion of the decision).
103
Prior to the Court’s determination in Sutton, it was quite common for an individual
who was found not to qualify as disabled to turn to a “regarded as” claim, although most
of those claims failed. See, e.g., Talk v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 165 F.3d 1021 (5th Cir. 1999)
(plaintiff sought to establish regarded as claim after failing to prove he had a substantial
limitation); Wooten v. Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382 (8th Cir. 1995) (employee on light
duty was neither disabled nor regarded as such); Newberry v. East Texas State Univ., 161
F.3d 276 (5th Cir. 1998)(plaintiff sought to prove his employer regarded him as disabled
after failing to establish that his behavior qualified as disabled); Robinson v. Global
Marine Drilling Co., 101 F.3d 35 (5th Cir. 1996) (plaintiff’s asbestosis was not a
substantial limitation and employer did not regard individual as disabled because he had
asbestosis). Courts frequently treat the regarded as claim summarily and in unpublished
opinions. See Gibbs v. St. Anthony Hosp., 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 2362 (10th Cir. 1997)
(plaintiff sought to establish employer regarded him as disabled when he failed to
establish his lifting restrictions constituted a disability). See also Issacharoff & Nelson,
supra note 22, at 328 (discussing potentially circular nature of regarded as claim).
104
Sutton, 527 U.S, at 493.
105
As noted previously, there is currently a debate occurring in the lower courts
concerning whether employers must offer accommodations to individuals who are
regarded as disabled. See D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, 422 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2005)
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offer an example from my own experience. Shortly after the ADA was
passed, I noticed an airline ticket agent who had one arm. From what I
could tell, he typed just as fast as someone with two arms, but prior to the
ADA the airline likely would never have given him the opportunity to
perform the job because of its perception that two arms were required for
effective typing. In most instances, individuals with conditions such as
this who are treated adversely by their employers ought to succeed under
the basic definition of disability and therefore would not need to avail
themselves of the regarded as prong but that may not always be the
case. 106 More to the point, this is precisely the kind of condition or
situation that the ADA was intended to address – the employer’s
misperception of the ability of an individual with a disability. While many
different interests and motives lay behind the statute, a central goal was to
overcome those misperceptions, the lack of understanding of the abilities
of those with disabilities, and perhaps that is the best way to conceive of
the regarded as prong. In contrast, one would have to look far and deep to
find any collective sense that the ADA was intended to help those who
wear glasses overcome the stigma and travails that comes along with the
glasses, and I think the same can be said of those with high blood pressure,
chemical sensitivity, and the like.107 In the end, this may be a limited
concept of what the regarded as prong was intended to encompass, but it
seems likely the best judicial interpretation one could hope for absent a
more pointed and specific statutory directive.
In discussing the inevitability of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Sutton, it is equally important to emphasize how the Court reached its
conclusion that mitigating measures were to be considered: the Supreme
Court ignored statutory language, legislative history, and an EEOC
regulatory interpretation while focusing instead on language from the
statutory preface, which it never adequately dealt with.108 In its opinion,
the Court emphasized the statute’s prefatory language which states that 43
(holding that employer must offer accommodations to regarded as disabled individuals
and discussing circuit split).
106
The legislative history of the ADA mentioned a situation in which a child with
Down’s syndrome was removed from a zoo so as not to upset the animals. See H.R. No.
101-485, 101st Cong, 2nd Sess., at 8 (1990). This, too, seems an unusual situation for the
regarded as prong because presumably the child would qualify as disabled under the
statute. The House Report also identified a severe burn victim as falling within the
category of a physical impairment that does “not in fact result in a substantial limitation
of a major life activity.” Id. at 25-26
107
Cf. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability,” 86 VA. L. REV.
397 (2000), arguing for an antisubordination approach though we differ in some
significant respects on what conditions would fall within such an approach.
108
Both the EEOC and the Justice Department had issued regulations stating that an
individual should be assessed in her unmitigated state, but the Court rejected that
interpretation. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482 (“We conclude that Respondent is correct that
the approach adopted by the agency guidelines – that persons are to be evaluated in their
hypothetical uncorrected state – is an impermissible interpretation of the ADA.”).
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million individuals were disabled, concluding that not requiring mitigating
measures would greatly expand the statute’s coverage beyond 43
million.109 Yet, under the Supreme Court’s interpretation, the number of
individuals covered by the statute now certainly falls well below 43
million since from the legislative history it was clear that Congress
intended to include in that original number at least some individuals who
can mitigate their disabling condition.110 Without some explanation, it is
difficult to see how an interpretation that restricts the intended scope of the
statute should have any priority over one that expands that scope.
When statutory language is ambiguous, as it decidedly is in the
definition of disability, without guidance from some alternative source, the
Court will be left with its own normative vision of how the statute ought to
be interpreted, and that is what it appears the Court accomplished in
Sutton and the other cases discussed below. In the case of the disabilities
Act, the Court has frequently accomplished its statutory objective by
rejecting administrative interpretations. Relevant to the Sutton case, the
EEOC and the Justice Department had both promulgated regulations
directing that the determination of whether an individual is disabled
111
should
exclude
mitigating
measures.
From this perspective, Sutton is surely a paradigmatic example of the
Court’s selective use of statutory construction tools. Indeed, in Sutton,
one can plausibly claim that the Court focused on irrelevant language at
the expense of more clear language and clear legislative history, and
disregarded agency interpretations along the way in order to read the
statute consistent with its own normative vision. Although this is hardly
an example of neutral reasoning, it was highly predictable nevertheless.112
B. Exposing the Limits of the Backlash Thesis.
1. Williams v. Toyota Mfg. Another case that has come in for
considerable scholarly criticism, Williams v. Toyota Motor Mfg., was
decided shortly after Sutton and fits within the framework described above
of a fully predictable judicial result, and one that again has narrowed the
scope of the statute.113 Unlike the Sutton case which presented a terrible
109

Id. at 484.
In his dissent, Justice Stevens criticized this aspect of the majority’s opinion. See
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 498 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
111
See note 107 supra.
112
Jim Brudney and Corey Ditsler make a similar argument with considerable focus
on the Sutton decision. The authors conclude their study by noting: “[T]he Court’s
reliance on canon-based reasoning can seem plausible and ‘objective’ under one set of
conditions, unpredictable and inconsistent in a second setting, and strategically or
ideologically driven in a third. . . ” James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslar, Canons of
Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 112
(2005).
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Toyota Motor Manuf. Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
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test case, the carpal tunnel syndrome at issue in Williams was bound to
make its way to the Supreme Court and was an issue that had to be
resolved. Ella Williams worked on the assembly line at a Toyota plant,
and like many individuals working in similar positions, she suffered
injuries to her hands, arm, and wrist from the repetitive motion of the line.
Toyota’s own doctor diagnosed Williams with carpal tunnel syndrome and
placed her on permanent work restrictions. 114 For the next two years,
Williams worked on modified light duty but still missed some work, and
she ultimately filed a workers’ compensation claim that the parties settled.
Williams was then assigned to a quality control line where she worked
without problem for another two years until she was required to rotate
through all of the various job tasks, which included certain manual tasks
she could not perform without significant pain. At this point, she was
again placed on work restrictions and the employer later terminated her
purportedly for her poor attendance.115
The Williams case fell at the ill-defined intersection of three
different statutes: workers’ compensation, long-term disability under
social security and the ADA. From an institutional standpoint, the idea
that carpal tunnel syndrome is generally not covered by the ADA fits the
Supreme Court’s interests in two distinct ways. First, carpal tunnel
syndrome is typically a work-related injury, and would generally be
covered under the more limited workers’ compensation system, which
provides a no-fault scheme for injuries suffered in the course of
employment and does so by providing limited statutory remedies for the
injuries in state administrative forums.116 Just as the Court was hesitant to
open the door to nontraditional disabilities in Sutton, the Court was also
understandably reluctant to turn the ADA into an alternative forum for
workers’ compensation claims, not just because it would prefer to keep the
cases out of federal courts but also because allowing such claims would
eviscerate the exclusivity of workers compensation.117
114

Id. at 187.
Id. at 188-89.
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Because workers’ compensation provides limited remedies, as part of the no-fault
bargain, many employers tell their employees to file workers’ compensation claims at the
first sign of carpal tunnel syndrome as a way of limiting their exposure. Ergonomics
injuries comprise a substantial portion of compensation claims. See Orly Lobel,
Interlocking Regulatory and Industrial Relations: The Governance of the Workplace,
ADMIN. L. REV., 1071, 1095-97 (2005) (discussing ergonomics in context of workers’
compensation).
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Now Chief Justice Roberts emphasized this point towards the end of the brief he
filed on behalf of Toyota Motors. See Brief of Petitioner, at 18 (noting that the lower
court’s decision “upsets the statute’s interaction with workers’ compensation laws.”). At
oral argument, the second question that came from the Court involved the relationship
between workers’ compensation and the ADA, and the issue reappeared throughout the
argument. As a general matter, when an employee is injured on the job, she is able to
obtain prompt relief from the workers’ compensation scheme. While certainly not
without its problems, that scheme represents a deliberate and careful compromise in that
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The second factor counseling against ADA coverage of carpal
tunnel syndrome relates back to what I earlier discussed as the concerns of
business. Carpal tunnel syndrome is among those ergonomic injuries that
the business community fought so strongly against for years, including by
blocking the development of an ergonomics standard in the Department of
Labor.118 Those efforts were led by Eugene Scalia, one of the many sons
of Justice Scalia, who cut his teeth as a labor lawyer by becoming one of
the most prominent critics of the presence of ergonomic injuries – a task
that earned him the brief reward of Labor Department solicitor.119 Given
the controversy surrounding ergonomics injuries, it seems likely that at
least some members of the Court would greet the issue of carpal tunnel
syndrome with skepticism, while others would have seen the case as
potentially transforming the ADA into an alternative form of workers’
compensation, something the Court was clearly unwilling to do. In the
context of the judicial backlash story, it is worth emphasizing that the
Supreme Court decision in Williams was unanimous.
Most of the criticism of the Williams decision ignores the workers’
compensation aspect of the case to focus on the Court’s restrictive
interpretation of the statute, which now requires individuals to establish
that they are limited in performing tasks that are of “central importance to
most people’s lives.”120 This restriction has forced courts into awkward
inquiries concerning whether individuals are capable of brushing their
teeth or hugging their spouses in order to determine whether they are
disabled.121 While this inquiry has led to excluding some individuals who
the employee does not have to prove the employer was at fault, and in return the remedies
are quite limited. The remedy is also exclusive; in other words, it is generally easy for
an employee who is injured on the job to get into the system but it is intentionally very
difficult to get out of the established compensation scheme.
118
See MARION CRAIN, PAULINE KIM & MICHAEL SELMI, WORK LAW 926-27 (2005)
(discussing battle over ergonomics standards).
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See Christopher Marquis, Bush Bypasses Senate on 2 More Nominees, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 12, 2002, at A1 (noting that Eugene Scalia who had previously denounced
ergonomics as “quackery” had received a recess appointment). Since I emphasized the
workers’ compensation aspects of the case that were included in the briefs and arguments,
I should note that at the oral argument, there was no discussion relating to the nature of
carpal tunnel syndrome, although the issue was raised specifically in the amicus brief
filed on behalf of the petitioner by Levi Strauss.
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Toyota, 534 U.S. at 198. For criticisms of the case see Kathleen Hale, Toyota v.
Williams’ Further Constricting the Circle of Difference, 4 J. L. & SOC’Y 275 (2003);
Jeffrey W. Larroca, Toyota Motor Manuf., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams: Disabling the
Americans With Disabilities Act, 19 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH & POL’Y 363 (2002).
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See, e.g., Nuzum v. Ozark Auto Distrib., 432 F.3d 839, 846 (8th Cir. 2005)
(considering but not deciding whether hugging was a major life activity); GuzmanRosario v. UPS, 397 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2005) (plaintiff’s ovarian cysts did not interfere with
sitting down or doing housework); Heiko v. Colombo Savings Bank, 434 F.3d 249 (4th
Cir. 2006) (elimination of waste was a major life function); Rooney v. Koch Air, Inc.,
410 F.3d 376 (7th Cir. 2005) (individual was not disabled because able to crawl and bend);
McGeshick v. Principi, 357 F.3d 1146 (10th Cir. 2004) (working in stairwells and
cleaning ledges was not a major life activity). A substantial number of cases, with
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were likely intended to be covered by the ADA, the case is a natural
extension of the concerns addressed in Sutton. The Court’s decision in
Sutton was necessary to keep anyone with a medical condition the
employer sought to consider from raising a “regarded as” claim; it was
necessary in Williams to restrict the definition of major life activity so as
to close the workers’ compensation door. Reminiscent of its decision in
Sutton, reaching its conclusion in Williams, required the Court to disregard
an EEOC guidance and more logical textual analysis as the price of
ensuring there was “a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled.”122
Despite the Court’s circuitous path, there is little question that its decision
was ultimately consistent with the purpose of the ADA, which no one
could plausibly contend was intended to supplant workers’ compensation
or to allow those with work-related injuries to seek accommodations in
addition to the remedies available under workers’ compensation.123
2. Chevron v. Echazabal. Two other cases deserve mention within
the framework of this article. In Chevron v. Echazabal, the question was
whether the statutory language that permitted employers to restrict actions
when an employee posed a danger to others could be stretched to include
danger to oneself. 124 The case posed an unusual situation because
Echazabal had a serious illness (Hepatitis C) and Chevron contended that
allowing him to continue working would pose a risk to his life. Most
individuals in these circumstances would not want to continue working,
and it seems, on the merits alone, the Supreme Court would likely side
with the employer who was engaging in paternalistic rather than obviously
discriminatory actions. Yet, of the cases discussed in this paper,
Echazabal presented the most difficult path for the Court to reach its
desired result, namely that employers could exclude individuals who
posed a danger to their own health.
The Court’s path was tortured because the language of the
statutory affirmative defense at issue in the case did not say anything
about posing a risk to oneself, specifically mentioning only “a direct threat
to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace.”125 An EEOC
regulation supported Chevron’s interpretation, but having just ignored
EEOC regulations in Sutton and Williams, one might have thought the
Court would be constrained to again disregard the regulation, particularly
conflicting results, have involved interpersonal skills raising the question whether getting
along with others or belonging is a major life activity. For an analysis of these cases and
advocating a broad approach see Ann Hubbard, The Major Life Activity of Belonging, 39
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 217 (2004).
122
Sutton, at 197.
123
This latter point is perhaps more controversial One might arguably maintain that
the accommodation provision of the ADA should enable one otherwise unable to work
due to a workplace injury to return to employment in some more limited capacity.
124
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002).
125
42 U.S.C. § 12113(b).
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given that the statutory language was unequivocal. In other words, if the
Court were true to the statutory language, and to its prior interpretive
methodology, it should have ruled in favor of Echazabal by holding that
the EEOC regulation was in conflict with the statutory language. A
second, and in some ways even more problematic, hurdle was the parallel
to the Court’s earlier decision in Johnson Controls, where the Supreme
Court had invalidated an employer’s practice of excluding women from a
battery making facility as a way to protect their fetuses from lead
exposure. 126 A central premise of Johnson Controls was that women
should be able to choose for themselves how to protect their bodies and
potential fetuses, and in many ways it seemed an easier determination that
employees should be able to decide whether they wanted to continue
working knowing the risks the work presented to their own health. As a
matter of expressed judicial policy, and clear statutory language,
Echazabal should have prevailed but that was not to be.127
In its unanimous decision, the Supreme Court dismissed the
parallel to Johnson Controls in a footnote,128 and also had little trouble
finding that the employer’s actions were permissible. Equally clear, the
Court’s decision evinced a paternalistic attitude, an attitude that has long
prevailed when it comes to the disabled and one that demonstrates that,
certainly to the Court, disability discrimination is different from
discrimination based on gender or race, or the other traditional categories.
This latter point ties into the lack of a social movement on disability, as it
suggests that we have failed to move the debate forward regarding the
treatment of those with disabilities, and instead remain locked in what
should be an outdated viewpoint. In the Echazabal case, not even clear
statutory language made a difference -- the Supreme Court instead chose
to follow the EEOC interpretive guideline after having rejected similar
guidelines in Sutton and Williams.
3. Bragdon v. Abbott. This leads to the final case I want to
highlight to show how the Supreme Court has interpreted the ADA
consistent with broad social norms.129 Bragdon v. Abbott has been one of
the few notable successes in the Supreme Court, a case in which the Court
found that an asymptomatic HIV-positive individual was covered by the
126

In’tl UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
The case is analyzed by Professor Sam Bagenstos, who was counsel to Echazabal
in the Supreme Court, in Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Supreme Court, the Americans With
Disabilities Act, and Rational Discrimination, 55 ALABAMA L. REV. 923 (2004).
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Echazabal, 536 U.S, at n.5.
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The one case that does not necessarily fit within this schema is Cleveland v. Policy
Mgt. Systems Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999), where the Court held that it was possible that
an individual could be disabled for the purposes of obtaining Social Security Disability
Insurance and therefore unable to “engage in gainful work” while simultaneously
pursuing a claim under the ADA. What was perhaps most surprising about this decision
is that it was unanimous, as was true for Echazabal and Toyota Motor Manuf.
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statute because she was limited in the major life activity of procreation.130
Although on the surface it may seem obvious that someone who is HIVpositive should be treated as disabled, it was not such an easy conclusion
given that the statute requires the individual be limited in a major life
activity and one definition of being asymptomatic is that an individual is
not so limited. As a way of bringing the claim within the statute, the court
defined reproduction as a “major life activity,” and did so based on agency
interpretations, experience under the Rehab Act, and an opinion by the
Office of Legal Counsel.131 Although the Court’s decision is intuitively
appealing, it creates some curious theoretical difficulties in cases
involving menopausal women or others who are not capable of
reproducing. 132 At the same time, the Court’s decision seems entirely
consistent with Congressional intent and broader social norms, which
almost certainly would find those who were HIV-positive as among the
group that ought to be protected by the disability laws.133
IV. UNDERSTANDING THE EVOLUTION OF THE ADA.
To this point, I have been telling a story that serves primarily as a
counter story to the prevailing theme of judicial backlash. As just
discussed, there is little question that the Supreme Court has narrowed the
scope of the statute, and I have suggested it has done so to bring the statute
in line with broad social norms regarding what ought to be defined as a
disability. The Court has accomplished this feat without substantial regard
for legislative intent, or a principled approach to statutory interpretation
but in doing so appears to have drafted a statute Congress prefers as
evident by its failure to override the judicial interpretations, or more
specifically by the lack of any effort to override those interpretations. In
this section, I want to explore what additional lessons the case study might
present regarding statutory interpretation, and the limits of seeking social
change through litigation. Although one must always be cautious about
drawing broad conclusions from a single case study, the evolution of the
ADA provides keen insights into the Court’s methodologies and how it
can impose its own preferences – preferences that will often follow, rather
than transform those social norms.
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Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
Id. at 638-46.
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Mark Kelman has noted the potential absurdity of the Court’s interpretation, which
might mean that a menopausal woman would not be covered by the statute and the
Court’s analysis required it to ignore the fact that the dentist would have refused to treat
someone who had full-blown AIDS. See Mark Kelman, DOES DISABILITY STATUS
MATTER?, IN AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW
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A. Can the Court’s Approach Be Reconciled With Theories
of Statutory Interpretation?
1. Normative Theories of Interpretation. The ADA poses a
particularly difficult challenge for the reigning theories of statutory
interpretation. Within contemporary legal debates, the various theories of
interpretation can be roughly divided into two camps, the textualists who
emphasize the statutory text and eschew dependence on legislative history,
and the intentionalists who prefer methods of interpretation designed to
divine the intent of Congress and are far more willing to probe into
legislative materials beyond the statutory text. The last decade has seen a
lively debate arise over the merits of the two approaches, 134 but in the
context of the ADA, neither approach provides a satisfactory means of
interpreting the statute, leaving courts to their own normative framework
to define the scope of the statute.
The goal of textualists is to arrive at an objective intent embodied
in the words of the statute as reasonably understood by an observer given
the context of the statute’s passage. 135 As should be evident from the
statutory language discussed earlier, an interpretation based on the
reasonable understanding of the text is likely to run aground quickly – no
one would think to define disability as a “substantial limitation on a major
life activity,” and even if someone did, each word would still require
interpretation. Similarly, the ambiguity present throughout the text cannot
easily be resolved by any objective practices, such as a turn to a dictionary
or various canons of construction. In Sutton, the Court resorted to a
grammatical construction of the statute, and while its interpretation was
plausible, other interpretations were equally plausible. Indeed, the Justice
Department and the EEOC both read the same language differently
without resorting primarily to legislative history.136
Intentionalists would not fare much better. Even though the
legislative history provided some answers to general questions –
134

The literature is expansive and most of it is centered on normative considerations.
As is widely recognized, Justice Scalia and Judge Easterbrook are the best known judicial
proponents of a textualist method, and their arguments have been extremely influential.
Among academics, John Manning has emerged as the leading defender of textualism. A
good summary of the debate and the purported differences between textualism and
intentionalism can be found in Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism, 91 VA. L. REV. 347
(2005), though Nelson argues that the two camps are not as different as their various
proponents state. In this section, I will use the term intentionalism, which seems
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purposivism. For an argument similar to Nelson’s but that invokes purposivism see
Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2006).
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See John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 421
(2005) (“Textualists thus aspire ‘to read the words of [a statutory] text as any ordinary
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See earlier discussion re Sutton.
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particularly on the mitigating measures issue – it failed to address, and
ultimately left open, most of the difficult specific questions. Some earlier
versions of intentionalism required courts to ask how Congress would
have addressed the issues that later emerged,137 and it would have been
very difficult to apply the general answers found in the legislative history
to the specific problems that have arisen. For example, although Congress
suggested that an individual ought to be assessed in his or her unmitigated
state, it almost certainly did not mean to include individuals who wear
glasses within that determination. More likely, had they considered the
issue with more care, Congress would have concluded that mitigating
measures should only be disregarded when assessing individuals with
traditional, or serious, disabilities.138 But that is, at best, just a guess, and
even if Congress had made that determination, there would still have been
a question how to define a serious, or traditional, disability, thus leaving
substantial discretion for judicial interpretation. A similar analysis would
apply to carpal tunnel syndrome, and canvassing the legislative history
provides no definitive answer to whether workplace injuries were intended
to be covered or whether they ought to be left to the workers’
compensation remedial scheme.
One reason both of the common interpretive approaches fail to
yield results is that both approaches assume there is some discoverable
legislative intent either from the text or other legislative materials. 139
However, with the ADA, it is a mistake to assume there was any such
intent other than in a most general way. If one were to ask members of
Congress what they intended when they passed the ADA, the vast majority
would have been unable to say anything more than that they intended to
prohibit discrimination based on disability. If they were pressed to offer
an opinion on what they meant by disability, virtually none would have
been able to offer a reliable answer, and instead would likely have pointed
to the sponsors as offering an authoritative guide.
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This approach is sometimes referred to as imaginative reconstruction and it is tied
to older theories of interpretation designed to further Congressional purpose. See Richard
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they would have wanted the statute applied to the case at bar.”).
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policy impulses or intentions into finished legislation.”).
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From this perspective, relying on legislative history might be most
consistent with congressional intent. Dan Rodriguez and Barry Weingast
have developed a theory of statutory interpretation that emphasizes the
important role played by pivotal legislators in ensuring passage of
legislation.140 They focus in particular on the critical role conservative
Democrats played in ensuring the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
to suggest that the views of those legislators, rather than the views of the
bill’s sponsors, provide the best guide to legislative intent.141 This theory
is premised on a better, and more realistic, view of Congress than most
theories of statutory interpretation, but it remains problematic from a
variety of perspectives. Perhaps the most significant limitation surrounds
defining pivotal legislators – while Rodriguez and Weingast typically look
to the final legislators who sign onto legislation, relying on the
interpretation of those last legislators may neglect the view of the more
liberal legislators who may have declined to support legislation that only
went as far as that supported by the most conservative members.142 In any
event, turning the theory upside down, when a bill has no substantial
opposition, the views of the sponsors might be the best evidence of
legislative intent if for no other reason than that the other members of
Congress would likely have no developed views. Yet, in the case of the
ADA, focusing on the views of the bill’s sponsors would not have
provided much more than a general directive, and that directive would
have suggested little more than that the statute ought to be construed
broadly to further the statute’s remedial goals.143
Although the primary methods of statutory interpretation wound
fail to provide any conclusive answers, it might be argued that the Court’s
decisions are consistent with interpretive theories that emphasize the role
of social norms or public values. William Eskridge has, for example,
highlighted the importance of public values in giving meaning to
ambiguous statutory language, though he has also sounded a cautionary
140

See Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of
Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and its Interpretation,
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of Expansionist Statutory Interpretations, forthcoming NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY
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Rodriguez and Weingast label pivotal legislators turned on particular interpretations of
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the Civil Rights legislation. See NICK KOTZ, JUDGMENT DAYS: LYNDON BAINES
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rights legislation consistent with its remedial purpose. See, e.g., Zipes v. TWA, 455 U.S.
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interpreting filing deadlines); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975)
(defining back pay as central to the remedial purposes of Title VII).
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note about the limits of such an approach. 144 In Professor Eskridge’s
model, it is inappropriate for courts to “use[] public values analysis to
displace an apparent legislative decision that has not been overtaken by
changed circumstances.” 145 At the time he was writing, Professor
Eskridge seemed to assume that incorporating public values into statutory
analysis would likely broaden remedial statutes, and the cases he
championed as models of public value reasoning were those in which civil
rights, or other important liberal values, were ultimately upheld.146 The
Court’s decisions on the ADA, and its statutory approach, would be
difficult to reconcile with Eskridge’s theory; in fact, he specifically
condemned judicial efforts to rewrite statutes while ignoring clear
language or other legislative materials.147
The Court’s implicit emphasis on social norms might also be seen
as consistent with a textualist approach to interpretation. A central precept
of the textualist method is that a court ought to define statutory terms
based on common understandings.148 Given that the Supreme Court has
largely defined disability consistent with existing social norms, it might
appear that the Court’s method is, in fact, a principled textualist approach.
This argument, however, neglects the specific textual words – “a
substantial limitation on a major life activity” – and would allow the
Supreme Court to substitute a common sense definition for the specific
statutory text. This might be a reasonable approach for the Court to take
but it is a difficult one to reconcile with an emphasis on the actual written
text. In other words, the Court’s approach might be defined as textualist if
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the statute sought to “protect the disabled,”149 leaving those terms to be
defined through litigation based on broad social norms, but the statute,
particularly as illuminated by the legislative history, offered a far different
textual definition.
2. Positive Political Theory.
If the particular normative theories of statutory interpretation prove
unhelpful, another theory steeped in positive political theory (“PPT”)
might provide some insight into the Court’s decisions. Although there are
variations of the PPT approach, all models identify the Supreme Court as a
strategic actor that is intent on implementing its own policy preferences.150
Those preferences are most commonly defined as political in nature but
there is no particular reason those preferences need to be limited to policy
issues,151 and institutional preferences have likely had a greater influence
on the Court’s approach to the ADA than particular policy preferences.
The idea behind PPT is that the Supreme Court is engaged in a strategic
game with Congress, and to a lesser extent the President, to impose its
preferences without later having those preferences overruled or modified.
To keep from being overruled, the Court must stay within a policy range
that will be respected by the existing Congress or the gatekeeping
Congressional Committee, or which will be of sufficient importance to the
President to justify a veto. An important aspect of this theory is that, in
making its strategic decisions, the Court looks to the preferences of the
existing Congress as opposed to those of the enacting Congress.152 Within
law, Professor William Eskridge has developed the model most
extensively with a particular focus on the civil rights decisions that
prompted the Civil Rights Act of 1991, as an indication, in part, how the
Supreme Court played the game poorly given that its decisions were
149
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language.
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theory “the preference configuration of the current legislature is far more important for
the results of statutory interpretation than is that of the enacting legislation”).
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subsequently, and relatively quickly, overruled.153 The assumptions that
fuel Eskridge’s model, and those developed by others, are many and the
analytical results often limited. 154 Nevertheless, the model has been
influential within legal scholarship and is a variant of other models
developed within political science that are gaining increased attention.155
On at least a surface level, the PPT model offers considerable appeal for
understanding the Court’s methodology.
The Supreme Court’s decisions have typically narrowed the scope
of the ADA by redefining the core concept of disability, and the Court has
done so in a way that is clearly contrary to the more expansive approach
adopted by the enacting Congress. And, in terms of a game, the Supreme
Court has guessed right: Congress has not sought to overturn its decisions
so that the Court’s policy preferences have, for the time being, been
solidified. Yet, there are at least two primary difficulties in relying on this
strategic theory to explain the Court’s ADA decisions. First, many of the
controversial judicial decisions have been unanimous and given the
ideological diversity of the Court, it seems unlikely that the Justices would
be unanimous at least in their political preferences. They might, however,
be unanimous in their institutional preferences, in particular in their desire
not to displace workers’ compensation remedies, or perhaps more
specifically not to transform the federal courts into workers’ compensation
forums, or to increase substantially the disability caseload. The Justices
might also be in substantial agreement that those who wear glasses, suffer
from high blood pressure, or other relatively minor conditions should not
be defined as disabled, but that only suggests that the Court would desire
to rewrite the statute, and would not necessarily explain any particular
strategic considerations, unless there was reason to believe Congress
intended those conditions to be covered.
This leads to the second concern with relying on PPT to explain
the Court’s decisions. As noted previously, Congress sharply rebuked the
Supreme Court with the 1991 Civil Rights Act, which was passed at about
the same time as the ADA, and under a PPT approach one would expect
the Supreme Court to react to that statute by curtailing its preferenceimpositions in light of an expected Congressional rebuke. In fact, this is
what has largely occurred with Title VII, where over the last decade a
chastened Supreme Court has issued a series of decisions that have
153

See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the
Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 613 (1991). Although
the referenced article most directly relates to a discussion of the ADA, Professor Eskridge
developed his argument through a series of articles that were later incorporated into a
book. See EskKRIDGE, supra note 144.
154
For a balanced but skeptical review see Jeffrey A. Segal, supra note 150.
155
For a comprehensive overview of the political science literature see POSITIVE
THEORIES OF CONGRESSIONAL INSTITUTIONS (K. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast eds.
1995).
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advanced the interests of plaintiffs and which are clearly contrary in spirit
to the rulings that prompted the 1991 Act.156 But simultaneous with its
restrained interpretations of Title VII, the Court began to emasculate the
ADA, and just to make sure Congress noticed, it took three cases in one
Term and slashed them all. 157 From this perspective it is difficult to
explain why the Supreme Court would act in a restrained fashion with
Title VII while interpreting the ADA narrowly and contrary to
congressional intent.
Staying within Eskridge’s model, one might conclude that the
Court made a judgment that Congress was unlikely to care about the ADA
whereas Congress had clearly demonstrated its commitment to the
interests of Title VII. While plausible, this seems highly unlikely as a
strategic matter, though, again, it has turned out largely to be true. Yet,
there would have been no significant basis for such a conclusion, other
than perhaps looking at the sloppy language of the statute. The ADA
passed with overwhelming support, typically a sign of strong
congressional interest rather than disinterest, and the statute was
purposefully broad in its scope. It is also unlikely that the Supreme Court
would have such a strong contrary policy preference with respect to
disabilities, or strong enough to risk Congressional rebuke in the same
manner that had occurred with Title VII.158
156

In retrospect, there have been a surprising number of such decisions, many of
which were unanimous reversals of lower courts on rather straightforward issues. See,
e.g., Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1235 (2006) (unanimous decision finding that
the number of employees was not a matter of subject matter jurisdiction); Ash v. Tyson
Foods, 126 S.Ct. 1195 (2006) (unanimously and summarily reversing 11th Circuit
standard on pretext and test for direct evidence); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506
(2002) (unanimously rejecting heightened pleading standard for employment
discrimination cases); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997) (unanimous
decision holding the term “employee” includes former employees); Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Serv., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (unanimously approving of same-sex harassment
theory); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000)
(unanimously rejected pretext-plus theory). The Supreme Court’s series of sovereign
immunity decisions might be seen as inconsistent with a positive portrayal, but upon
reflection those cases fit the Court’s scheme. Although the Supreme Court held that the
Eleventh Amendment barred enforcement of the ADA and the age discrimination statute
against state entities, both of those statutes are subjected to rational basis review under
the constitution. In contrast, when the Court moved to the Family and Medical Leave
Act, which it treated as a gender-based statute, and thus subject to an intermediate level
of scrutiny, the Court held that application to the states was consistent with the Eleventh
Amendment. See Nevada Dep’t of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003)
(upholding application of FMLA to states); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62
(2000) (holding that Congress had exceeded its authority in applying ADEA to the states);
Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (same with respect to ADA). Most
recently the Court held that Title II of the ADA could be applied against the states. See
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
157
Sutton, Albertson’s and Murphy were all issued on the same day.
158
Focusing on institutional concerns might explain a contrary preference, if what the
Court was primarily concerned about was a rising caseload devoted to disabilities claims.
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Within the PPT model, the focus would be on the Congress in
place when the decisions were issued, which was decidedly more
conservative than the enacting Congress, and in narrowing the scope of the
statute, the Court has moved closer to the position originally staked out by
a small group of conservative members of Congress.159 Shifting the focus
to the contemporaneous Congress, however, does not solve the puzzle of
the differing approach to Title VII. Presumably, a more conservative
Congress would welcome narrower interpretations of civil rights statutes
across the board, and there is no reason to think they would desire narrow
interpretations of the ADA but broad interpretations of Title VII.160 One
possible explanation would emphasize the different stages of statutory
evolution – the Court’s interpretations of the ADA concentrate on core
issues whereas Title VII is at a more mature stage of development with
more tangential issues to be resolved. This interpretation might explain
some of the Court’s more limited interpretations under Title VII, but it
would not explain most of its recent expansive decisions including the
decision last Term to adopt a broad interpretation of retaliation even in a
case where the interpretation was unnecessary to the outcome of the
case.161
Changing the focus of the strategic interaction to the Court’s
institutional interests, combined with the lack of a prominent social
movement regarding disability may help explain what the Court has
accomplished, and why it has done so. As noted earlier, there is simply
no way to identify the Court’s decisions as consistent with any principled
method of interpretation: the Court adopts EEOC interpretations when
they support the decision and ignores them when they do not, and these
are interpretations from the very same agency operating under the very
Yet, during this same time period, Title VII claims tripled and this sharp increase in cases
did not prompt restrictive interpretations. See Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private
Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV.
1401 (1998) (discussing increase in employment caseload).
159
The House shifted from Democratic to Republican-control with the 1994 elections,
and many of the new members were quite conservative. For one of the many books
chronicling the changeover see NICOL C. RAE, CONSERVATIVE REFORMERS: THE
REPUBLICAN FRESHMAN AND THE LESSONS OF THE 104TH CONGRESS (1998).
160
Similarly, if the Supreme Court was weighing the preferences of the current
Congress when it issued its decisions, it might have taken the opportunity to render
restrictive interpretations of Title VII so as to preserve its decisions that were overturned
in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
161
Burlington Northern v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006) (unanimously adopting
broad definition of retaliation even though plaintiff had prevailed in lower court on more
restrictive definition). Several years earlier, in Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90
(2003), the Supreme Court unanimously held that the mixed motives theory, in which a
plaintiff can prevail by establishing that an illegitimate motive was a substantial
motivating factor in an employment decision, was not limited to cases of direct evidence.
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), Justice O’Connor had written an
influential concurring opinion stating that the theory should only be available in cases
that involved direct evidence.
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same congressional authorization. The Court emphasizes statutory
language and sentence structure in some cases but turns its eye on clear
language in others, and yet all of the decisions appear to be consistent with
broad social norms and institutional concerns. While there is very little
helpful empirical data on the specific questions, it seems fair to suggest
that most people would not define those who wear glasses or who have
high blood pressure as disabled, at least in any broad sense, just as it is
likely true that most individuals would agree that those who are HIVpositive should be defined as disabled. Institutionally, the Court has a
strong interest in not opening the federal litigation doors to workers’
compensation claims, which are otherwise confined to lowly
administrative courts, and at least some members of the Court likely have
a political policy preference to limit the number of claims employers are
likely to face. But it is important to emphasize that the Supreme Court
decisions are not simply the product of a conservative Court seeking to
trump legislative preferences with its own policy preferences. Rather, the
Court has reconstructed the statute consistent with broad norms of
protections society would provide; it is perhaps the statute Congress
should have written, and would have written if there had been pressure to
do so.
B. The Importance and Absence of a Social Movement.
Although the Court’s interpretations may bring the statute closer to
the policy preferences of the current Congress, 162 the real freedom to
rewrite the statute did not come from Congressional preferences, or the
lack thereof, but the absence of any social movement demanding
legislative changes. Congress is not likely to move to overturn judicial
decisions without significant pressure from interest groups, and that is
particularly true with the ADA given that the Court’s decisions have
generally favored the business community, which lost out in the original
statutory play but which remains a strong legislative force. In the context
of the ADA, there is simply no substantial lobbying force to push statutory
162

Whether the Court has, in fact, moved closer to the preferences of the current
Congress is difficult to know without some tangible evidence of those preferences,
especially in light of the strong support among Republicans the original legislation
received. It is perhaps more accurate to suggest that the Court has moved closest to the
preferences of those minority members of Congress who opposed the ADA but that, too,
is a difficult estimation to make. Professor Einer Elhauge has recently advocated an
approach to statutory interpretation that emphasizes tracking current legislative
preferences over those of the enacting legislature. See Einer Elhauge, PreferenceEstimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027 (2002).
Like Bill
Eskridge’s dynamic theory discussed earlier, Elhauge’s theory seems best suited for
updating older statutes rather than interpreting contemporary ones. Indeed, Elhauge’s
theory would be difficult to implement any time Congress alters its political balance, as it
can easily do every two years. For a perceptive critique of Elhauge’s theory see Amanda
L. Tyler, Continuity, Coherence, and the Canons, 99 NORTHWESTERN U. L. REV. 1389
(2005).
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reform, and that will remain true so long as the Court does not carve out
traditional disabilities from the statutory scope, where there is a
sympathetic lobbying force.
This leads to one final lesson to be drawn from this case study
regarding the importance of social movements. The last few years have
seen a surge of interest within legal scholarship regarding the importance
of social movements in the pursuit of equality. Traditionally the social
movement literature has identified legal action as in tension with social
change, with law frequently seen as disruptive to more meaningful
political action. 163 More recently, legal scholars have emphasized the
interrelation between effective social movements and legal action. 164
Professor Bill Eskridge has explored the relationship as it applies to
constitutional law, with a particular focus on gender and race movements,
as well as the development of social change in the area of sexual
orientation.165 In his classic work on the pay equity movement, Michael
McCann demonstrated how legal actions can energize social movements
resulting in significant political progress even when those legal actions
ultimately fail, as they typically did in the context of the comparable worth
movement he studied.166 Within antidiscrimination law, three areas where
substantial progress has been made over the last few decades – sexual
orientation, sexual harassment and affirmative action – all had parallel
social movements that supported the development of an effective legal
strategy.167 Social change, Eskridge and others have concluded, requires
both legal action and a coherent social movement.168
163

Much of the social movement literature focuses on how social movements arise
and are sustained. I am interested in the slightly different question of the interrelation
between social movements and legal action in promoting social change. For an overview
of the social movement literature and its relevance to legal change see Edward L. Rubin,
Passing Through the Door: Social Movement Literature and Legal Scholarship, 150 U.
PA. L. REV. 1 (2001); see also NICK CROSSLEY, MAKING SENSE OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
(2002) (exploring sociological theories on creating and sustaining social movements) .
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See Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of
Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 1489 (2005) (“Nineteenth and twentiethcentury social movement history . . . counsel that law and social movements are
fundamentally in tension. They teach that social movements attain leverage in the
political and legal processes by engaging in disruptive protest action taken outside
institutionalized political structures; that legal and political change are codependent, but
that influence runs from politics to law; and that law can both harm and help social
movements in unintended ways.”).
165
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on
Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2405-06 (2002);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law,
150 U. PA. L. REV. 419 (2001).
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See MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE
POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994).
167
I am obviously painting with a wide brush, and will leave this thought
undeveloped while providing an illustration. With sexual harassment, the country
experienced an important public discussion in the context of the Clarence Thomas
hearings. Those hearings, and the public discussion, led to important legislative changes
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The experience with the ADA supports this emerging claim, as the
lack of an effective social movement influenced both the development of
the original legislation and its subsequent interpretation. With greater
social pressure, Congress may have drafted more specific legislation, or at
least addressed some of the imminent issues more clearly, such as the
question of mitigating measures or the potential conflict with workers’
compensation laws. It is also possible that a coherent movement would
have arrived at a more specific definition of disability, rather than one that
could accommodate any or all conditions. A social movement devoted to
increasing public awareness about disabilities and the many ways in which
our society is constructed based on a limited norm of ability might also
have affected the normative vision the Supreme Court brought to its
interpretive task. In contrast, it was unrealistic to expect to alter the very
definition of disability by simple legislative action, just as it was
unrealistic to expect the Supreme Court to allow the Suttons to go forward
with their claim as a way of protecting other more deserving claims.
Instead, as this case study demonstrates, the Supreme Court remains
steeped in an outdated notion of disability, one that emphasizes limitations
rather than abilities and sees the disabled as deserving of protection rather
than independence.
Too frequently we think of the Supreme Court as apart from, or
above, broader social norms or movements, even though we are repeatedly
reminded that the Court most commonly mimics rather than transforms
social norms. As Robert Post has recently written regarding constitutional
decisions, courts work “within the web of cultural understandings that it
shares with the society that it serves.”169 This is not to say that courts
cannot influence society or prevailing social norms, but rather the
influence typically works in both directions, as was particularly apparent
in the recent battle over affirmative action. In the University of Michigan
cases, there seems little question that the amicus briefs filed by elite
universities and powerful figures had a profound effect on the Court’s
ultimate determination, just as the Court’s approval of affirmative action
in Bakke influenced elite public opinion.170 But when the work of social
change is left exclusively to the courts, advocates are almost certain to be
disappointed in the ultimate results.

– the damage provisions added to Title VII were a direct result of the lack of remedies for
many claims of sexual harassment under the equitable remedies model. Sexual
harassment claims thereafter increased dramatically, as did business concern and judicial
attention. As a result, many like Yale Professor Vicki Schultz now claim that sexual
harassment law has gone too far in ridding sexuality from the workplace. See Vicki
Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061 (2003).
168
Eskridge, supra note 165, at 2406-07.
169
Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts,
and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 77 (2003).
170
See Brown-Nagin, supra note 164, at 1526.
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This is not to say that there has not been an important disability
rights movement that has made a significant social impact. In the early
1970s, the Independent Living movement proved extremely successful in
deinstitutionalizing many of those who lived with disabilities but were
capable of living outside of an institutional setting.171 The next decade
saw the emergence of ADAPT, which focused on the inaccessibility of
public transportation and engaged in various protests around the country
designed to highlight that inaccessibility. 172 The protests centered at
Gallaudet University succeeded in producing a deaf President for the first
time in the school’s history and last Fall student protests again prompted
the board to alter its Presidential choice. 173 All of these movements,
however, were limited in their focus and none sought to expand the
definition or concept of disability; in fact, all were centered around
traditional disabilities. Equally important to the future of the ADA, none
of the movements sought to integrate workplace issues into the protests
and none spawned a broader or sustained group that could carry on the
work beyond the targeted issues.
In the end, without a broader social movement pushing to alter the
public consciousness of disability, there was simply no reason to expect
that the Supreme Court would interpret the statute expansively and many
reasons to expect that they would do so narrowly. Many of the difficult
interpretive issues surrounding what constitutes a disability involve
contested social meanings, and, as noted previously, it seems that the
Supreme Court has tracked public opinion in defining the scope of the
ADA. In order to transform our definition of disability, it is necessary
first – or at least simultaneously -- to alter the public imagination. Courts
can assist in that effort but they cannot do all the work.
V.

CONCLUSION.

The first decade of experience under the ADA provides important
lessons for the way in which we think about the power and limits of courts.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the ADA narrowly, but as discussed
extensively above, those interpretations were both predictable and appear
consistent with the reigning definition of disability. The statute’s effort to
transform that definition, to transform our imagination, has largely failed,
even though we have made significant progress on many disability issues.
Many might be critical of the legislative nature of the Court’s actions – but
those actions were likewise inevitable, particularly when confronted with a
171

See SCOTCH, supra note 26, at 49-60 (tracing history of Independent Living
Movement).
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See, e.g., Irving Kenneth Zola, We Overcame: The Story of Civil Rights for
Disabled People, 21 POLICY STUDIES J. 802 (1993) (review essay discussing role of
ADAPT); SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 127-29 (highlighting importance of ADAPT
protests).
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See note 75 supra.
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poorly drafted statute and a disinterested Congress. Whether the Court has
been engaged in a strategic game with Congress to enforce its own
preferences is a difficult conclusion to draw. It is, however, relatively
easy to conclude that the Court’s decisions are not the product of any
particular theory of interpretation. It is also likely that what the Supreme
Court has done has been fully consistent with Congressional expectations,
assuming those expectations were to provide protections for those
traditionally defined as disabled without significantly transforming that
definition. This is obviously substantially less than what the disability
advocates had envisioned, or what they might argue Congress enacted, but
without a broader social movement, without broader public involvement in
the legislative process, the statute the Court has reconstructed may be the
best we can expect.

48

